கொழும்பில் உள்ள அமெரிக்க தூதரகத்தில் இருந்து 2007 ஆம் ஆண்டு மார்ச் 14 ஆம் திகதி அமெரிக்க வெளியுறவு அமைச்சுக்கு அப்போதைய தூதுவர் ரொபேட் ஓ பிளேக்கால் அனுப்பப்பட்ட இரகசிய இராஜதந்திர கடிதத்தில் இருந்து விபரங்கள் வெளியில் கசிந்து உள்ளன.
2002 ஆம் ஆண்டு யுத்த நிறுத்த ஒப்பந்தம் கைச்சாத்திடப்பட்டது. அதன் பின் வந்த மாவீரர் தினத்தில் பிரபாகரன் உரையாற்றியபோது அருகில் கருணா நின்று இருக்கின்றார். கருணாவை பிரபாகரன் அறிமுகப்படுத்திக் கொண்டார்.
இக்காணொளியையே அமெரிக்க தூதரகத்கத்திடம் கையளிக்க கோட்டா இணங்கினார் என்று இக்கடிதத்தில் உள்ளது.
VZCZCXRO4586
OO RUEHBI RUEHLMC
DE RUEHLM #0416/01 0730542
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 140542Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5651
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0275
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 9963
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 6932
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 5009
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3603
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0747
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 3690
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 1012
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2770
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 7505
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 5209
RUEHON/AMCONSUL TORONTO PRIORITY 0137
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1888
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000416
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS AND SCA/RA
MCC FOR S GROFF, D NASSIRY, E BURKE AND F REID
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2017
TAGS: PTER PGOV MOPS PREL CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: DEFENSE SECRETARY OUTLINES SIX-MONTH
MILITARY STRATEGY
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROBERT O. BLAKE, JR. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)
¶2. (C) PDAS Steven Mann, accompanied by Ambassador and Pol
Chief, met Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa on March 8.
Gothabaya, noting that an overwhelming majority of Sinhalese
Buddhists had voted for Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2005, told us
that his brother's popularity among the majority community
was still strong. However, Sri Lanka's system of
proportional representation in Parliament meant that the
President's party would never secure an absolute majority on
its own. This, he explained, had made it necessary to create
such a big cabinet to satisfy everyone. Mann responded that
the President's considerable political skills and his strong
support made him the right leader to make progress on a
solution to Sri Lanka's ethnic problem. The U.S. hoped that
the new power-sharing proposals that emerge form the current
consultation process would be of a quality that hadn't been
seen before.
¶3. (C) Gothabaya told us that the government was sure the
LTTE did not believe in a political solution. He said the
GSL has recently come into possession of a videotape of a
speech by Prabhakaran apparently recorded about two months
after the signing of the CFA in 2002. In the video, Karuna
was standing next to Prabhakaran and introduced him.
Prabhakaran asserted that the LTTE knew it would never reach
its goal of a Tamil Homeland ("Eelam") through peaceful
means. He told Karuna's cadres, who were about to return to
the East, that the CFA only signified a pause for the LTTE,
during which they could regroup, rearm, resupply, recruit and
retrain. Gothabaya agreed to provide the Embassy a copy of
the tape.
¶4. (C) Gothabaya thought the government could reach out to
the Tamil people, particularly their educated technocrats.
"People need to know that there is a normal life waiting for
them after the conflict," he said. It was therefore
important for the government to intervene immediately and do
development work in the areas in the East that had recently
come under its control. The Tamils also needed genuine
representation, Gothabaya said. The people had no confidence
in the Tamil National Alliance, which was simply a
placeholder for the LTTE. On the other hand, Gothabaya
asserted that previous attempts by Sri Lankan government to
"introduce" alternative Tamil representatives in the North
and East had failed, and would not work in the future, either.
COLOMBO 00000416 002 OF 003
¶5. (C) Gothabaya said that over the next six months, the
military planned to consolidate its control over the East,
then stabilize the border region adjacent to the LTTE-held
Vanni. Vavuniya remained a problem, with much LTTE
infiltration, which was also causing problems in an
east-to-west arc toward Mannar. In order to secure
unfettered access to the population in government-held
Mannar, the army would seek to push the Tigers back a bit
more. The government would try to deny the LTTE resupply of
arms and ammunition, then put pressure on them to return to
the negotiating table.
¶6. (C) Gothabaya noted that cutting off arms LTTE shipments
to Sri Lanka might be easier than stemming financial flows.
The Tigers didn't need t bring the money they raised abroad
to Sri Lanka he said, but used it abroad to purchase arms.
Wile the Navy and other security forces had found i
difficult enough to choke off LTTE resupply of mmunition, it
was worth the effort to try to do s. While Prabhakaran,
with his terrorist mentaliy, would likely never give in, his
younger cadre might eventually grasp that there is no
militar solution to the conflict, he thought.
¶7. (C) rime Minister Wickremenayake had visited a number of
Southeast Asian countries and concluded MoUs oncooperation
against LTTE arms smuggling with sevral governments,
including Indonesia and Thailan, Gothabaya noted. He added
that the LTTE arms hip sunk on February 28 had refitted and
replenished in an Indonesian harbor. However, Gothabaya
thought that the LTTE smuggling operations were not occurring
with the approval of those governments, but that certain
corrupt officials were abetting them.
BLKE
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