6/23/2004 7:18
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001062
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR E.MILLARD
PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2014
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, CE, NO, External Relations, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: NORWEGIAN PEREGRINATIONS FOR PEACE
REF: COLOMBO 1013 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. Reason 1.5 (b,d).
SUMMARY
-------
1. (C) Norwegian visit to Delhi was largely a briefing for
the Indians, who expressed support for Norway and its role in
the peace process. Both GSL and LTTE have asked Norway to
continue to try to find a formula to allow them to resume
talks. Norwegians may wait until after July 10 Provincial
elections before making a new proposal, but Solheim will
visit Sri Lanka next week for discussions. LTTE continues to
be upset about alleged GSL support for breakaway leader
Karuna. The GSL is taking some steps which "test the limits"
of the Cease Fire Agreement. END SUMMARY.
2. (U) Ambassador met with Norwegian Ambassador Hans
Brattskar June 22 to discuss recent Norwegian activities in
support of Sri Lankan Peace Process. These included meetings
last week between Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Helgesen
and Sri Lankan President Kumaratunga in London, between
Norwegian Special Envoy Solheim and Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) adviser Balasingham also in London, and
Helgesen,s visit to New Delhi. Solheim will return to Sri
Lanka next week.
BRIEFING THE INDIANS IN NEW DELHI
---------------------------------
3. (C) Brattskar traveled to New Delhi for Helgesen,s
meetings with the new Indian government June 19. Helgesen
met with Foreign Minister Singh, National Security Adviser
Dixit, and the Foreign Secretary. Brattskar described the
meetings as basically a briefing by Norway on the peace
process, with very little input by the Indians. The Indian
officials, he said, were supportive of Norway and its role,
and asked many questions. They said that India would play a
positive role, and that there would be "no surprises."
Brattskar did note that Dixit said that his own views on Sri
Lanka were naturally colored by his experiences there as High
Commissioner from 1985-87.
CBK AND BALASINGHAM IN LONDON
-----------------------------
4. (C) Brattskar said that Helgesen had a two hour
one-on-one meeting with President Kumaratunga in London last
week. (Kumaratunga was in London to attend her daughter´s
graduation from medical school.) They had a "good exchange."
Helgesen clarified for her that it is not Norway which is
insisting that the two sides agree on a statement before they
can meet again. Kumaratunga had suggested that the two sides
could proceed on the basis of an "understanding" if they
could not reach agreement on a statement. But, said
Brattskar, LTTE distrust is so deep that they will not move
forward without "something solid."
5. (C) The good news is that both sides have asked the
Norwegians to continue to work the issue. For the LTTE, this
was confirmed by both Balasingham in London and by
Thamilchelvam in his meeting with Brattskar on June 16
(Reftel). Brattskar noted that the two sides had been "very
very close" to an agreement several weeks ago, but that the
government had kept putting new things in. Norway would now
try to come up with a new, and simpler, text to which both
sides could agree. (Brattskar confirmed that the statement
would be one by Norway, not by the two sides.) The
Norwegians were considering what such a statement might look
like, and also what might be the right time to try to move
ahead. One school of thought is that the Government will not
be able to agree to anything until after the Provincial
Council Elections on July 10, so Norway might delay until
that point. Brattskar did say, however, that Special Envoy
Eric Solheim would return to Sri Lanka next week for talks
with both sides.
6. (C) Brattskar agreed with Ambassador that President
Kumaratunga had so far been much more flexible than the LTTE.
Her last offer -- to conclude negotiations on an interim
administration and then to begin negotiations on final issues
while the interim administration was being set up -- was
quite forward-leaning. The LTTE was so suspicious, however,
that they had not moved at all, said Brattskar. He noted
that Government actions tended to reinforce LTTE suspicions.
The LTTE was especially worked up about the situation in the
East and alleged Government support to Karuna. (See Septel
for more details.) Balasingham and Thamilchelvam had both
stressed the need to maintain the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA).
Unfortunately, Brattskar said, the Government was taking
some steps which were not good at this time. For instance,
the Sri Lankan Navy and the LTTE were now embroiled in a
dispute over movement of LTTE cadres by boat. The Navy was
attempting to unilaterally change the procedures which had
been followed until now. Brattskar described this as the
Navy &testing the limits,8 which was not good at this
sensitive time. He also said that Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission head General Furhovde was quite unhappy about this.
(Ambassador will see Furhovde, who is currently out of
Colombo, early next week.)
COMMENT
-------
7. (C) The current Norwegian tactic of stepping back for a
minute and then trying to come up with a fresh formulation
which could satisfy both sides seems a good one at the
moment. Ambassador will make points about all sides needing
to compromise and necessity to support the Cease Fire when he
holds an &on the record session8 with leading editors on
June 24. Importance of the cease fire and seeking
clarification on recent changes in naval procedures with the
LTTE would also be useful topics to raise during Deputy
Secretary,s upcoming meeting with Sri Lankan Navy chief
SIPDIS
Admiral Sandagiri. END COMMENT.
LUNSTEAD
14. 6.3.2004: Ignoring orders of LTTE leadership, rebel commander remains ensconced in east
3/6/2004 8:31
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000406
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, S/CT, SA/INS, INR/NESA
NSC FOR E. MILLARD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/14
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINR, MOPS, CE, NO, Elections, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: Sri Lanka: Ignoring orders of LTTE
leadership, rebel commander remains ensconced in east
Refs: (A) Ops Center - Colombo 03/08/2004 telecon
- (B) FBIS Reston Va DTG 060831Z Mar 04
- (C) Oslo 419
- (D) Colombo 387, and previous
(U) Classified by Charge´d´Affaires James F. Entwistle.
Reasons 1.5 (b,d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: The main Tamil Tiger organization in
the north announced March 6 that it was replacing a
dissident commander. The commander, Karuna, has refused
to step down, however, and remains ensconced in his
eastern jungle base. No violence has been reported, but
the situation is becoming increasingly tense in the
east. The GSL has indicated that it has no plans to
deal directly with Karuna despite his requests that it
do so. In the meantime, the campaign for the April 2
parliamentary elections proceeds apace in the rest of
the country. Karuna´s split from the main LTTE
organization appears to be the most serious internal
crisis ever faced by the group. If there is no
resolution to the situation, there will almost certainly
be complications for the peace track down the road. END
SUMMARY.
====================================
LTTE Acts to replace Rebel Commander
====================================
2. (U) The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have
reacted to eastern military commander Karuna´s recent
moves to separate his command from the main organization
(see Ref D). On March 6, LTTE Political chief S.P.
Thamilchelvam, speaking at a press conference held in
the northern LTTE-controlled town of Kilinochchi,
announced that Karuna had been removed from his
position. An official statement posted on the pro-Tiger
website "TamilNet" explained the decision in the
following (choppy) manner:
"Mr. Karuna, who was commander of Batticaloa-Ampara,
instigated by some malicious elements opposed to the
Tamil Eelam liberation struggle, acting traitorously to
the Tamil people and the Tamil Eelam national
leadership, has planned to secede himself from the
liberation organization. The commanders, divisional
heads and cadres under him unable to acquiesce with his
traitorous act have refused to comply with his orders
and met with the national leadership, and explained the
ground reality prevailing there. In accordance with
this, Karuna has been discharged from the Liberation
Tiger organization and relieved from official
responsibilities."
3. (U) The LTTE statement went on to name Ramesh
(formerly Karuna´s deputy) as "special commander" of the
Batticaloa/Ampara sector, Karuna´s former political
adviser Kaushlyan was retained as political head, and
two other cadre, Ram and Prabha, were named as commander
and deputy commander respectively. Speaking at the
press conference following the announcement of Karuna´s
expulsion from the Tigers, Ramesh stated "the decision
Karuna has made is his own. He has not discussed this
with the leadership. The commanders, officials, and
fighters do not accept the decisions he has made on his
own." Joining in the wave of criticism of Karuna was
former Batticaloa/Ampara Tiger political head Karikalan,
who was quoted by TamilNet as stating: "Karuna will be
seen as a Pol Pot if he continues to act irresponsibly
towards our people." Thamilchelvam was also quoted as
stating, "our leader is always ready to provide amnesty
to those who realize their mistakes and I have high
hopes that Karuna will be given amnesty." He also
indicated that the LTTE continues to support the peace
process, stating: "our leadership and our structures
remain firmly committed to peaceful negotiations and the
ceasefire agreement, and this isolated issue will not
affect the peace initiative."
======================
Karuna remains Defiant
======================
4. (SBU) For his part, Karuna remains defiant in the
face of his expulsion from the LTTE. Karuna, in an
interview with a local newspaper, was quoted as stating:
"We will not take orders from Prabhakaran." He also
asserted that the LTTE had sent out "killer squads" in
an effort to assassinate him. Karuna told the BBC that
he was willing to return to the main LTTE organization
if guarantees were given that eastern LTTE personnel
would receive the same treatment as northern elements
from now on. (Karuna has said his rebellion is based,
in part, on his view that northern LTTE members do not
respect members from the east.) Karuna also demanded
the removal of several high-level officials serving LTTE
leader V. Prabhakaran, including Intelligence Chief
Pottu Aman. Numerous media reports also carried
statements from Karuna´s spokesman, Varanthan, to the
effect that the breakaway faction of the LTTE controlled
by Karuna would function as an independent unit and
would continue to observe the ceasefire "even though we
are not a party to it." Varathan also said the LTTE´s
official statement of expulsion "lacked logic," as
Karuna had already made a decision to leave the group.
In a press report late on March 8, Varathan said the
dissident faction of the Tigers controlled by Karuna
would consider "a friendly partnership" with
Prabhakaran, but he did not provide further details.
5. (C) Estimates vary wildly, but there may be as many
as six thousand LTTE personnel in the eastern district
who remain loyal to Karuna. (There are unconfirmed
reports that the main LTTE organization may be
preventing up to 600 eastern cadre who have been based
in the north from returning to the east.) Karuna
himself is said to be ensconced deep in bases in the
Thoppigalla jungle located west of Batticaloa city.
These long-time LTTE bases are said to be well-
fortified. That said, it is not clear what financial
resources Karuna´s group has, and whether it has
significant supplies of food and ammunition for the long
haul.
===========================
Heightened Tensions in East
===========================
6. (SBU) While the majority of Mission´s contacts in
the east describe the situation there as calm for the
most part, an underlying mood of tension has been
developing since Karuna´s defection from the main
organization on March 3. Contacts at the Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission (SLMM) confirm that at least two pro-
Karuna protests took place in Batticaloa district on
March 7. Effigies of Tiger leader V. Prabakharan and
newly appointed eastern commander Ramesh were burnt in
both demonstrations. Pro-Karuna elements also sponsored
a hartal (work stoppage) on March 8 in Tamil areas of
Batticaloa and Ampara Districts that was successful in
closing down some shops. In a related development,
examinations have been postponed at Eastern University,
located 20 kilometers south of Batticaloa city, and
student housing at the Tamil-dominated university has
been closed down and students told to leave.
7. (C) Although tensions are inching up, no violence
has been reported. Contacts indicate a significant
increase in the number of LTTE forces gathering in an
area dividing Trincomalee District from Batticaloa
District, however. Kurt Spur of the SLMM´s Trincomalee
office told poloff March 8 that there had been a "large
increase" in the number of LTTE cadre gathered near the
town of Verugal in this area. The forces in the Verugal
area appear to be loyal to the main LTTE organization.
It is not clear whether these forces plan to enter
Batticaloa District in an attempt to oust Karuna.
(There are reports that the main LTTE organization has
arrested Pathuman, the political chief for Trincomalee.
The reports are unconfirmed, but Pathuman may have been
arrested because he is considered pro-Karuna.)
============================
GSL Takes "Hands-off" Policy
============================
8. (C) The Sri Lankan government appears to be sticking
to a "hands off" policy regarding the LTTE crisis. Late
March 5, Defense Secretary Cyril Herath rejected the
idea of negotiating a separate ceasefire pact with
Karuna´s breakaway faction, stating in a press interview
"when there is one ceasefire agreement signed between
the Prime Minister and Prabhakaran, how can we have
another?" (Per Ref D, Karuna had approached the Sri
Lankan military last week and offered to negotiate a
separate ceasefire accord for the east.) Karuna was
reportedly not happy with this response from the GSL,
and was quoted as stating that if the government did not
deal with his faction "I will be forced to display my
strength." Despite reports to the contrary in the local
press, the Sri Lankan military has said it is not on
"high alert." Military spokesman Colonel Sumeda Perera
told poloff March 8 that the military was closely
monitoring the situation in the east, however.
9. (SBU) As of March 8, both President Kumaratunga´s
People´s Alliance (PA) party and Prime Minister
Wickremesinghe´s United National Party (UNP) continue to
remain virtually mum regarding the LTTE rift. In one of
the few instances of comment on the Tiger situation by a
political entity in the south, the Patriotic National
Movement (PNM), an extremist Sinhalese group linked to
the radical Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) party,
issued a statement on March 7. The statement alleged
that the split in the LTTE presented an opportunity for
the south to undermine the LTTE and perhaps destroy the
group. The PNM asserted that the SLMM should not get in
the middle of the situation and criticized the PM for
not using the situation in a way that would break up the
LTTE organization.
=========================================
Parliamentary Election Campaign continues
=========================================
10. (SBU) Against the backdrop of the recent
developments in the Tiger organization, the campaign for
Sri Lanka´s upcoming April 2 parliamentary elections
continues apace. President Kumaratunga and PM
Wickremesinghe have been speaking in front of large
rallies in various parts of the country. Candidates
have also been engaged in canvassing in a normal
fashion. Based on what Mission is hearing, campaigning
continues in LTTE-influenced areas like Jaffna and
Trincomalee. Some canvassing is reportedly even taking
place in Batticaloa and Ampara Districts, though at a
lower level than before the LTTE crisis. In other
election-related developments, a team of election
monitors from the European Union arrived in Sri Lanka on
March 7. The leader of the EU´s monitors, John
Cushnahan, a senior European parliamentarian, is slated
to arrive on March 10. The EU team will consist of
roughly sixty monitors when it is fully on the ground
(twenty are expected to arrive this coming weekend).
=======
COMMENT
=======
11. (C) The exact dimensions of Karuna´s split from the
main LTTE organization are as yet unclear. As touched
on above, there are conflicting reports, for example,
over whether the bulk of LTTE forces in the east remain
loyal to Karuna, or to the main LTTE organization.
Moreover, although it took the step to fire Karuna in a
very public manner, it remains unclear whether the LTTE
plans to move quickly to try to oust him (or worse), or
to proceed more cautiously, perhaps because it does not
yet have enough forces in place in the east to take
action against him. In any case, Karuna´s split from
the main LTTE organization appears to be the most
serious internal crisis ever faced by the group.
12. (C) If the situation is not resolved quickly, there
will be implications for the peace process. In the
near-term, there does not appear to be any serious
threat to the informal peace process, though out-and-out
warfare between rival LTTE factions could lead to
serious complications in affected areas. In the longer
term, however, the Norwegian facilitators will have
their hands full monitoring the ceasefire accord and
trying to resume peace talks if there are two de facto
LTTE groups, one in the north and the other in the east.
END COMMENT.
13. (U) Minimize considered.
ENTWISTLE
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