8/11/2003 11:05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001399
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT
NSC FOR E. MILLARD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08-11-13
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINS, PREF, CE, NO, FR, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: Norwegian facilitator set to arrive to work on
LTTE base issue; Tigers get ready for Paris meeting
Refs: Colombo 1387, and previous
(U) Classified by James F. Entwistle,
Charge´ d´Affaires. Reasons 1.5 (b, d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Norwegian Special Envoy Erik Solheim
is slated to arrive in Sri Lanka on August 12. One key
purpose of his visit is to try to convince the Tigers to
vacate an unauthorized camp they have set up in the
east. In other peace process news, the Tigers are
getting ready for a seminar in Paris scheduled to begin
August 20. Solheim is known to have good links with the
Tigers, but settling the camp issue will be a tough sell
given the group´s hard-line stance on the matter. END
SUMMARY.
========================
Solheim due in Sri Lanka
========================
2. (SBU) The Norwegian Embassy has confirmed that
Special Envoy Erik Solheim, a key player on the GoN
peace facilitation team, is due to arrive in Sri Lanka
on August 12. One key purpose of his visit, which is
slated to last several days, is to try to convince the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) organization to
vacate an unauthorized camp it has set up in Trincomalee
District in the east. In July, the Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission (SLMM) had ruled that the "Wan Ela" camp was an
encroachment on GSL-controlled areas and thus a
violation of the February 2002 ceasefire accord. With
the LTTE adamantly refusing to vacate the site, the SLMM
washed its hands of the matter last week and referred it
to the Norwegian facilitators to resolve, thus setting
the stage for Solheim´s visit. During his time in Sri
Lanka, Solheim is tentatively scheduled to travel to the
LTTE-controlled Vanni region in the north to meet with
S.P. Thamilchelvam, the group´s political chief.
Solheim has met with Thamilchelvam on many occasions and
is said to have good rapport with him.
======================
More info on LTTE Camp
======================
3. (C) Regarding the camp, Mission checked with the
SLMM office in Trincomalee, which confirmed that as of
earlier today (August 11) the LTTE was still at the
site. SLMM Trincomalee chief Abdel Burkan confirmed
that his office will continue to run daily patrols in
the vicinity of the camp to check on the situation. Per
earlier remarks he has made to us (See Reftels), Burkan
said the roughly 15 LTTE inhabitants of the camp
remained friendly with the monitors. The camp was
small, about two soccer fields in size, and very
ramshackle with some huts, a tent, and a communications
antenna. Burkan estimated that the camp could be
dismantled quickly if the Tigers wanted to do so.
4. (C) Queried on whether he had heard of any other
LTTE camps encroaching on government areas, Burkan said
the monitors were examining one LTTE-occupied site which
seemed to be new. The site was located one/two
kilometers away from Wan Ela at a place called Uparu.
Whether the camp violated the ceasefire accord had not
yet been determined, he added. (Note: The Sri Lankan
military has told us that it thinks that, in addition to
Wan Ela, the LTTE may have established at least four
additional bases in the east in past months.)
==========================
Tigers get ready for Paris
==========================
5. (C) In other peace process developments, the Tigers
are getting ready for a seminar in Paris scheduled to
begin on August 20. The seminar, which is slated to
last approximately a week, will focus on
constitutional/legal issues. The seminar is also being
structured to help the LTTE decide on the nature of its
response to the GSL´s recent proposal setting out
modalities of forming a Tiger-dominated interim
administration for the the north/east. Contacts in the
Tamil community have confirmed that the LTTE´s
delegation will consist of approximately 20 people, 10
from the group and 10 representing pro-LTTE Tamils who
live in other countries. Thamilchelvam will lead the
delegation. The following names are also reportedly on
the delegation list:
-- Pulithevan (one name only), chief of the LTTE´s Peace
Secretariat
SIPDIS
-- V. Rudrakumar, a pro-LTTE lawyer living in the U.S.
-- Dr. V.T. Thamilmaran, a law lecturer at Colombo
University with close LTTE links
-- J. Maheswaran, a pro-LTTE Tamil based in Australia
with significant experience on humanitarian assistance
issues
6. (SBU) There are reports that Thamilchelvam may meet
with Anton Balasingham, the LTTE´s London-based chief
negotiator, somewhere in Europe before the Paris meeting
takes place. Balasingham, who has serious health
problems, apparently will not attend the Paris event
himself. In the meantime, the pro-LTTE website
"TamilNet" reported that Thamilchelvam spoke to a rally
in the Vanni on August 10. In his wide-ranging remarks,
Thamilchelvam made clear that the group was intent on
preparing a response to the GSL´s north/east proposal,
indicating that the peace talks could resume if the
group´s (as yet unidentified) counter-proposals were
accepted. He stated, in part:
"We would be ready to resume negotiations if the Sinhala
nation accepts our proposal for the interim
administration and follows the path of peace. We will
prepare and submit a proposal for an interim
administration that would essentially reflect the
aspirations and expectations of our
people...International legal experts and senior
academics will discuss the proposal before it is given
in final form. An interim administration is
indispensable to mend the war-shattered lives of our
people."
Aside from these basically upbeat remarks, Thamilchelvam
also made semi-threatening comments to the effect that
Tamils should be allowed to choose their own "destiny"
if the LTTE´s counter-proposals were rejected by the
GSL. He also took the opportunity to get his licks in
against two long-standing targets of Tiger vituperation,
President Kumaratunga and the Sri Lankan military.
Dredging up the history of past military campaigns,
Thamilchelvam basically accused the president and the
army of being warmongers and anti-Tamil in intent.
=======
COMMENT
=======
7. (C) Of all of the Norwegian facilitators, Solheim is
known to have the best links with the Tigers. He has
dealt with them for years and knows the topmost LTTE
leaders as well as any outsider. Even with these
advantages, settling the camp issue will be a tough sell
for Solheim. The group has taken an increasingly hard-
line stance on the issue. Solheim will have to use all
of his many wiles to convince them that their stance is
self-defeating. As for Paris, the Tigers seem to want
to use the meeting in a genuine way to review legal
issues. Thamilchelvam, for one, appears to be going out
of his way to flag that the Tigers are taking the
government´s proposal very seriously. END COMMENT.
8. (U) Minimize considered.
ENTWISTLE
21. 21.10.2009: SRI LANKA DENIES NEGOTIATIONS TO PROCURE LETHAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM IRAN
S E C R E T COLOMBO 000968
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENTS FOR ISN/CATR. EAP/K AND SCA/INS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PREF, PHUM, PTER, EAID, MOPS, CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA DENIES NEGOTIATIONS TO PROCURE LETHAL
MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM IRAN
REF: A. SECSTATE 46946
B. COLOMBO 710
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA A. BUTENIS. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)
1. (S) In a much-delayed response to our Ref A demarche on
possible Sri Lankan procurement of lethal military equipment
from North Korea and Iran, Sri Lankan Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) Director General (DG) Americas Division
Kshenuka Senewiratne on October 16 said they appreciated U.S.
concerns and stated that the GSL seriously considered the
information. According to Senewiratne, there was no evidence
backing the information we earlier provided in our demarche.
According to the DG, to stop speculation regarding possible
procurements of arms and ammunition from Iran, the GSL
conducted internal investigations and had found no records
that supported the allegations. DG stressed that the GSL
abided by the UN Security Council resolutions and ensured
that all guidelines were met. DG reiterated that post war,
the GSL did not envisage a need for additional military
hardware and hinted that the U.S. was receiving such
information from sources that sought to sour U.S.-Sri Lanka
relations. DG made no comments on procurements or
negotiations of lethal military equipment from North Korea.
2. (S) Comment: Notwithstanding the DG,s vehement denial of
GSL procurements and negotiations from Iran, the GSL,s
recent interactions with Iranian military officials raise
questions. At an October 6th meeting with SL,s Army
Commander, the Iranian Defense Attach Brigadier Asghary
Nekah discussed an upcoming military delegation led by
Iranian Army Brigadier Mahnoud Amini Ranjabar that suggested
future strengthening of the Iranian-Sri Lanka military
relationship. In a meeting with PolOff, the Japanese Defense
Advisor discussed his deep concerns of possible talks of
purchases and negotiations of arms and nuclear technology
during the upcoming Iranian visit.
BUTENIS
22. 24.4.2003: In another negative signal, Tigers postpone meeting
"C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000705 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, S/CT NSC FOR E. MILLARD LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL E.O. 12958:
DECL: 04-24-13
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINS, EAID, CE, NO, JA, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: In another negative signal, Tigers postpone meeting of key assistance committee
Refs: (A) FBIS Reston Va DTG 240442Z 03 - (B) Colombo 696, and previous - (C) Oslo 803 (Notal) (U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of Mission.
Reasons: 1.5 (B, D).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Late April 23, the Tamil Tigers postponed the next meeting of a key committee focused on humanitarian assistance issues. Admitting to being caught off guard, the Norwegian facilitators are reviewing next steps. The Indian polcouns told us he thought the decision was another tactical step. Coupled with their recent withdrawal from the peace talks, the latest Tiger move places added pressure on the whole process. END SUMMARY. ================================ Tiger Statement re Key Committee ================================
2. (U) In a statement issued late April 23, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) announced that it was postponing the next meeting of a key committee focused on humanitarian assistance issues (see Para 3 for information on this committee). The statement came in the form of a letter from S.P. Thamilchelvam, the head of the LTTE´s Political Section, to Ambassador Bernard Goonetilleke, the head of the GSL´s Peace Secretariat. SIPDIS
3. (U) (((Note: Before the LTTE´s April 23 announcement, the next meeting of the Sub-Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rebilitation Needs in the North and the East, ""SIHRN,"" had been scheduled to take place April 25-26 in Kilinochchi in the LTTE-controlled Wanni region. SIHRN, which began operations earlier this year as agreed in the peace talks, is a joint committee made up of GSL and LTTE representatives. Norwegian facilitators and Japanese advisers guide the process. SIHRN had been holding semi-regular meetings up to this point.)))
4. (U) The LTTE´s statement attributes the decision to postpone the meeting to ""our leadership´s wish to await action and implementation on urgent matters"" raised in its April 21 announcement that it was pulling out of the peace talks (see Ref B). The statement, the text of which is contained in Para 8, goes on to complain that: ""As you (the GSL) are aware, urgent action is required on resettlement and rehabilitation of internally displaced people and of refugees. We wish to implore the government of Sri Lanka to act on matters...enabling the return to normal life to people"" in the north and east. The statement wraps up by saying: ""We wish to reiterate that mutual trust and cooperation can be restored through decisive and urgent action"" by the government ""to alleviate the hardships of the people in the northeast."" ============================= Norwegian and Indian Reaction =============================
5. (C) When queried, Norwegian government facilitators admitted to being caught off guard by the LTTE´s latest action. In an April 24 conversation, Norwegian embassy polchief Tomas Stangeland told us the first indication the GoN had that the meeting was being postponed was a LTTE fax containing Thamilchelvam´s letter that came in April
23. Up to that time, the Norwegians, convinced the meeting was on, were preparing to send their team to Kilinochchi. In response to the unfolding events, Stangeland said Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar planned to meet with GSL officials led by chief negotiator G.L. Peiris to discuss next steps soon. The GoN has also forwarded a request to Kilinochchi to meet with Thamilchelvam within the next week (as of late April 24, there had been no response to this request from the LTTE). Stangeland added that he thought the decision by the LTTE to postpone the meeting was completely counter-productive. He said the Norwegian facilitation effort would keep plugging away, hoping that the Tigers´ recent decisions were mere posturing.
6. (C) In an April 24 meeting, Indian High Commission polchief Taranjit Sandhu told us the Tigers´ decision was another ""unfortunate"" move by the group. He said he thought it was a ""tactical"" step by the Tigers, who wanted to put pressure on the GSL to cave in on various issues, including by reducing the security zones in Jaffna. India, he commented, had no indication that the group was intending to leave the peace process altogether. The GoI would continue to monitor the situation, however.
======= COMMENT =======
7. (C) Coupled with their withdrawal from the peace talks, the latest Tiger move places added pressure on the whole process. At this point, the government and the Norwegians seem to be scrambling a bit to find a way to respond to the LTTE and, by doing so, try to prevent further unraveling. While the LTTE is broadcasting its views, it seems to have turned off the receive mode, however. Despite all the bad news, there is still not a sense of panic regarding the state of the peace process. That said, skepticism regarding the LTTE is steadily rising. END COMMENT. ====================== Text of LTTE Statement ======================
8. (U) The text of the LTTE statement issued late April 23 follows: Begin text: Mr. Goonetilleke: In accordance with the decision of our organization´s leadership to suspend our participation in the negotiations, we regretfully wish to postpone the next meeting of the sub committee on immediate humanitarian rehabilitation needs (SIHRN). It is our leadership´s wish to await action and implementation on urgent matters raised by Mr. A. Balasingham in his letter to the prime minister, Hon. Mr. Ranil Wickremsinghe, prior to setting a date for the next meeting. As you are aware, urgent action is required on resettlement and rehabilitation of internally displaced people and of refugees. We also wish to implore the government of Sri Lanka to take immediate steps to act on matters already agreed at previous meetings of the sub-committee and ensure humanitarian and rehabilitation projects in the northeast are implemented enabling the return of normal life to the people living there. In the meantime, we are also hopeful that all efforts will be made by your government to urgently seek the funds from pledges made by several international donors at the Oslo conference on 25th November last year to be targeted for identified projects through the northeast reconstruction fund (NERF). In the last few months, from announcements made at our meetings, expectations among the people of the northeast have been raised to a high level. Therefore it would be meaningless for the sub-committee to continue to meet regularly without any tangible action on the ground. While we regret that we are compelled to postpone the next meeting of the SIHRN, we wish to reiterate that mutual trust and cooperation can be restored through decisive and urgent action from the government of Sri Lanka to alleviate the hardships of the people in the northeast. Yours Truly, S.P. Thamilchelvam Head, Political Section Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam End text.
9. (U) Minimize considered. WILLS"
23. 22.4.2003: Tigers announce they are suspending peace talks
"C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 COLOMBO 000688 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, SA/PD, S/CT NSC FOR E. MILLARD LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL E.O. 12958:
DECL: 04-22-13
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, KPAO, EAID, CE, NO, JA, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: Tigers announce they are suspending peace talks; GSL, most observers see move as tactical
Refs: Colombo 685, and previous (Notal) (U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills.
Reasons: 1.5 (b, d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: In a press release dated April 21, the Tamil Tigers suspended their participation in the peace talks and said they will not attend the June donors conference. The GSL has not yet reacted in public to the statement (short of a very brief letter to the Tigers taking note of their statement). Minister Moragoda told us that he thought the move was tactical, ""shock therapy"" by the Tigers, as he put it. Other observers agree with this perspective. While the Tigers are always hard to read, we tend to agree that they still see the peace process as a going concern. A suggested press statement for Washington´s immediate review is contained in Para
10. END SUMMARY. --------------- Tiger Statement ---------------
2. (U) In a long press release dated April 21, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) suspended its participation in peace talks with the Sri Lankan government and said the group will not attend the June donors conference in Tokyo. (Note: Per the statement, the seventh round of GSL-LTTE talks, which had been set to take place in Thailand from April 29 - May 2, is now off.) The press release came in the form of a letter from the LTTE´s London-based spokesman and senior negotiator Anton Balasingham to Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. (Note: The text of the statement, as carried by pro-LTTE websites, is contained in Para 11.)
3. (U) The statement begins by tipping its hat to the peace process, noting that the prior rounds of talks and other interactions among the LTTE, government, and Norwegian government facilitators had ""fostered trust and confidence."" After this brief introduction, the statement hits it stride when it makes the following three major complaints about the peace process: -- April 14 Seminar: The statement asserts that the GSL and the Norwegian facilitators should have ensured the LTTE´s participation in all meetings on international assistance issues. Instead, the GSL and GoN allowed Washington to be the venue of the April 14 seminar on Sri Lanka despite being ""fully aware of the fact that the United States has legal constraints in inviting representatives of a proscribed organization"" to the U.S. The statement goes on to claim that the LTTE´s ""exclusion"" from the conference ""has seriously eroded the confidence of our people in the peace process."" (Note: The LTTE could not attend the seminar because the group is on our Foreign Terrorist Organization, ""FTO,"" list. This part of the statement is the only place where the U.S. is mentioned.) -- Ceasefire Accord Implementation: In its second key section, the statement asserts that the government has not done enough to implement the February 2002 ceasefire accord (a.k.a., ""the Ceasefire Memorandum of Understanding""). The LTTE asserts that ""tens of thousands of government troops continue to occupy our towns, cities and residential areas, suffocating the freedom of mobility of our people."" The statement goes on to claim that the GSL´s ""repeated assurances that the resettlement of displaced people would be expedited have proven futile."" (Note: About 300,000 displaced persons have, in fact, returned to their homes in the north and east since the peace process began. About 500,000 people remain displaced.) A specific reference is made to Jaffna District, where the LTTE has long complained that the GSL has not done enough to reduce the size of its ""high security zones."" -- Focus of Assistance: The third major section involves a long, rambling, vague claim that the government should not be asking for international assistance for all of Sri Lanka, but only for the war- torn north and east. According to the LTTE, ""(T)he poverty that is prevailing in southern Sri Lanka is a self-inflicted phenomenon, caused by the disastrous policies of past governments in dealing with the Tamil national conflict...This approach grossly understates the severity of the problems faced by the people in the northeast.""
4. (U) Briefly reciting these complaints, the statement wraps up by saying: ""Under these circumstances, the LTTE leadership has decided to suspend its participation in the negotiations for the time being. We will not be attending the donor conference in Japan in June. While we regret that we are compelled to make this painful decision, we wish to reiterate our commitment to seek a negotiated political solution to the ethnic question."" ------------ GSL Reaction ------------
5. (C) The government has not yet issued an official public reaction to the LTTE statement. (Note: Late April 22, Prime Minister Wickremesinghe sent a very brief letter to the LTTE´s Balasingham stating that the GSL had taken note of the Tigers´ concerns and planned to respond to them in full. A copy of this letter is being faxed to SA/INS.) In an April 22 conversation, Minister Milinda Moragoda, who had just returned from Europe, told the Ambassador that he thought the LTTE´s announcement was basically tactical in nature, ""a way to regain control of the agenda by the Tigers,"" as he put it. It was positive that the Tigers had made clear they were not pulling out of the talks on a permanent basis and had not pulled out of the ceasefire accord, for example. On this point, Moragoda related he had met J. Maheswaran, a pro-LTTE Tamil of Australian nationality, on his plane trip back from Europe. Moragoda said Maheswaran had told him he (Maheswaran) still intended to participate (as a LTTE representative) in ceasefire- related meetings. (Note: The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission has also told us that the LTTE has given no indication that it intends to cancel its participation in ceasefire-related meetings, including in the Sub- Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs in the North and the East, ""SIHRN."")
6. (C) In making the statement, Moragoda said the LTTE seemed to be using ""shock therapy"" because it felt a bit cornered, as many of the easy steps regarding the peace process had already been taken, leaving only tough decisions. In addition to being upset about the April 14 seminar, Moragoda remarked that he thought the group was also disturbed by political happenings in the south, including a possible linkup between the Opposition People´s Alliance (PA) and the radical, anti- peace process Janantha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). Noting that he had met with Norwegian envoy Solheim while in Europe, Moragoda said he and other GSL officials involved with peace process issues planned to meet with the Prime Minister late April 22 to formulate next steps. Ambassador Wills commented that the government would be wise to be restrained in what it says, but it should be firm with the LTTE. Moragoda said he agreed with that posture, and based on an earlier conversation, he thought the PM was on board for that sort of approach. He confided that he had spoken with G.L. Peiris, the GSL´s chief negotiator, who seemed a bit ""frazzled"" by the LTTE´s announcement, however. (Note: Peiris is also the government´s chief spokesman.)
7. (U) (((Note: Shortly after her return from an official visit to Bangladesh, President Kumaratunga issued a statement critical of the LTTE´s announcement. The president´s statement called the LTTE´s rationale for pulling out of the talks ""feeble"" and called for the group to reconsider its decision. In a rare joint meeting of the two political adversaries, the president and the Prime Minister are scheduled to discuss the situation on April 22.))) -------------- Other Reaction --------------
8. (C) Most observers we have spoken to agree with Moragoda that the Tigers´ statement was tactical in nature and not an indication that the group plans to end the peace process. Comments we have picked up included the following: -- N. Raviraj, a Tamil National Alliance (TNA) MP who has expressed concerns about the LTTE in the past, commented that he had ""full confidence"" that the current problems could be worked out. He said he believed that the Tigers´ non-invitation to the April 14 seminar was the ""spark"" that led to the LTTE´s releasing the statement, but he thought the group could be convinced to re-enter the talks. -- Joseph Pararajasingham, a Tamil MP with very close LTTE links, told us that Tiger officials had recently assured him that the group would not scrap the ceasefire accord. He was also confident that if the Norwegians took part in ""shuttle diplomacy"" they could get the LTTE to attend the June donors conference in Tokyo. He said he thought the LTTE truly was angered over the Sri Lankan military´s continuing large-scale presence in Jaffna, as well as its ""exclusion"" from the April 14 conference in the U.S. Notwithstanding the hard feelings, he predicted that these issues could be ""overcome,"" allowing the peace process to move forward. -- M.L.A.M. Hizbullah, a National Unity Alliance MP and a Muslim, said he was convinced that the suspension of talks would have little long-term impact on the peace process. He said the GSL should respond to the LTTE in good faith with proposals re the security zones in Jaffna and in other areas to assuage LTTE concerns. He also expressed doubts that the LTTE would not, in the end, attend the donors conference in Tokyo, as ""it was in their interest to be there."" -- Taking a somewhat different tack, V. Thevaraj, the editor of a Tamil-language daily newspaper, expressed some concern over what he described as ""deep anger"" within the LTTE. He stated that some in the LTTE remained furious over the deaths of 11 of its sea cadre in a confrontation with the Sri Lankan navy off the northeast coast in March (see Reftels). The LTTE´s statement, he averred, was an effort by its leadership to appease Tiger hard-liners, who remained bitter over this incident. -------
COMMENT -------
9. (C) While the Tigers are always hard to read, we tend to agree that that their statement seems basically tactical in nature and that they still see the peace process as a going concern. It was positive, for example, that the group did not permanently pull out of the peace talks; nor, based on what we are hearing, is it ending cooperation on ceasefire-related matters. Our guess is that Moragoda is right and that the group is trying to regain control of the agenda via some ""shock therapy."" The LTTE´s decision, as it happens, also appears to fit into its seeming long-term desire to slow down the pace of the peace process. (Note: Some observers say, for example, that the LTTE wants to wait until arch-foe President Kumaratunga´s term ends in late 2005 before it agrees to a negotiated settlement.) In issuing the statement, however, the LTTE is exposing itself to a lot of flak that it is undermining the peace track. We think that pressure on the group to remain a part of the process will not only come from the south, but also from many Tamils, who know that a return to war would be devastating for their community. END COMMENT. --------------------- Draft Press Statement ---------------------
10. (C) Attached below is a draft press statement for Washington´s immediate review. We would like Washington´s clearance by April 23 morning (local), so that the statement can be issued that day. We have received many press inquiries and would like to get a U.S. statement out right away. As an alternative to the attached statement, Washington may wish to consider issuance of a ""minimalist"" statement that simply regrets the LTTE´s decision, and urges it to reconsider, so as not to endanger the gains made by the peace process. We think it is important to be up-front and direct with the LTTE about its action, which is why we recommend the attached statement. Either way, we would appreciate Washington´s guidance ASAP. Begin text: We regret the decisions by the LTTE to suspend its participation in the Sri Lankan peace talks and not to attend the Tokyo donor´s conference scheduled for June. We reviewed carefully the ostensible reasons for these decisions cited in Mr. Balasingham´s letter to the Prime Minister dated April
21. We do not find them convincing. A well-intentioned party that truly wants a peaceful, political settlement to Sri Lanka´s conflict could deal with such grievances at the negotiating table. We call on the Tigers to reconsider and to return to the negotiating track. We also call on the LTTE and the Government of Sri Lanka to honor the terms of the ceasefire even while the talks are suspended. In the meantime, this interregnum in the talks could prove useful by giving both parties the opportunity to recommit themselves to negotiations. We have long supported the MOU even though we have also acknowledged it has not been implemented perfectly. Blame for this does not fall exclusively on the side of the Government of Sri Lanka, however, as the LTTE´s statement suggests. The Tigers, too, bear heavy responsibility for numerous breaches of the MOU. While the talks are suspended, we urge the LTTE to reflect carefully on its own transgressions. Assassinations of opponents, intimidation of Muslims, taxation without representation, aggressive Sea Tiger behavior and continued child recruitment do not build trust in the LTTE´s intentions. We continue to believe that the way out of Sri Lanka´s ethnic conflict is through negotiations facilitated by the Government of Norway. In this regard, we remain willing to do whatever we can to assist Sri Lanka as it tries to bring an end to this ugly war. End text. ---------------------- Text of LTTE Statement ----------------------
11. (U) The following is the text of the LTTE statement made by LTTE spokesman Anton Balasingham and issued late April 21: Begin text. Dear Prime Minister, In accordance with the decision of our leadership I am advised to bring to your urgent attention the deep displeasure and dismay felt by our organization on some critical issues relating to the on-going peace process. You are well aware that the Ceasefire Agreement that has been in force for more than one year and the six rounds of peace negotiations between the principal parties has been successful, irrespective of the occurrence of some violent incidents that endangered the peace process. The stability of the ceasefire and the progress of the peace talks, you will certainly appreciate, are the positive outcome of the sincere and firm determination of the parties to seek a permanent resolution to the ethnic conflict through peaceful means. The cordial inter-relationship, frank and open discussions and the able and wise guidance of the facilitators fostered trust and confidence between the negotiators and helped to advance the talks on substantial levels. The negotiating teams were able to form important sub- committees on the basis of equal and joint partnership. During the early negotiating sessions it was agreed that the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE should work together and approach the international community in partnership. The Oslo Donor Conference held on 25 November 2002 turned out to be an ideal forum for such joint endeavor. The LTTE has acted sincerely and in good faith extending its full cooperation to the government of Sri Lanka to seek international assistance to restore normalcy and to rehabilitate the war affected people of the northeast. The LTTE to date has joined hands with the government and participated in the preparation of joint appeals and programs. In spite of our goodwill and trust, your government has opted to marginalize our organization in approaching the international community for economic assistance. We refer to the exclusion of the LTTE from the crucial international donor conference held in Washington on 14 April 2003 in preparation for the major donor conference to be held in Japan in June. We view the exclusion of the LTTE, the principle partner to peace and the authentic representatives of the Tamil people from discussions on critical matters affecting the economic and social welfare of the Tamil nation, as a grave breach of good faith. Your government, as well as our facilitator Norway, are fully aware of the fact that the United States has legal constraints to invite representatives of a proscribed organization to their country. In these circumstances an appropriate venue could have been selected to facilitate the LTTE to participate in this important preparatory aid conference. But the failure on the part of your government to do so gives cause for suspicion that this omission was deliberate. The exclusion of the LTTE from this conference has severely eroded the confidence of our people. As you are aware, considerable optimism and hopes were raised among the people when your government, shortly after assuming power, entered into a ceasefire agreement with our organization, bringing to an end twenty years of savage and bloody conflict. Expectations were further raised when both sides began direct negotiations with Norwegian facilitation. In particular, there was a justifiable expectation that the peace process would address the urgent and immediate existential problems facing the people of the north and east, particularly the million people who are internally displaced by the conflict and are languishing in welfare centers and refugee camps. As such, the Ceasefire Agreement included crucial conditions of restoring normalcy which required the vacation, by occupying Sri Lankan troops, of Tamil homes, schools, places of worship and public buildings. Despite the agreed timeframe for this evacuation of troops, which has since passed, there has been no change in the ground situation. We have repeatedly raised the issue of continuing suffering of our people at every round of talks with your government. Your negotiators´ repeated assurances that the resettlement of the displaced people would be expedited have proven futile. The negotiations have been successful in so far as significant progress has been made in key areas, such as the agreement to explore federalism on the basis of the right to self-determination of our people. But this progress has not been matched by any improvement in the continuing hardships being faced by our people as a result of your government´s refusal to implement the normalization aspects of the Ceasefire Agreement and subsequent agreements reached at the talks. As a result, considerable disillusionment has set in amongst the Tamil people, and in particular the displaced, who have lost all hope the peace process will alleviate their immense suffering. Through there is peace due to the silencing of the guns, normalcy has not returned to Tamil areas. Tens of thousands of government troops continue to occupy our towns, cities and residential areas suffocating the freedom of mobility or our people. Such a massive military occupation of Tamil lands, particularly in Jaffna - a densely populated district - during peace times denying the right of our displaced people to return to their homes, is unfair and unjust. Your government, in international forums, continues to place poverty as the common phenomenon affecting the entire country. The Poverty Reduction Strategy forms the essence of the document Regaining Sri Lanka´ which defines the macro-economic policy of your government. Though poverty and poverty alleviation constitute the centrality of the new economic vision of your government as exemplified in `Regaining Sri Lanka´ the document fails to examine the causality of the phenomenon of poverty, the effects of ethnic war and the unique conditions of devastation prevailing in the northeast. In our view, the conditions of reality prevailing in Tamil areas are qualitatively different from southern Sri Lanka. The Tamils faced the brunt of the brutal war. Twenty years of intense and incessant war has caused irreparable destruction to the infrastructure in the northeast. This colossal destruction augmented by continued displacement of the people and their inability to pursue their livelihoods due to military restrictions and activities have caused untold misery and extreme poverty among the people of the northeast. Continued displacement has also depleted all forms of savings of these people disabling them from regaining their lives on their own. The war-affected people need immediate help to regain their dignity. They need restoration of essential services to re-establish their lives. Reconstruction of infrastructures such as roads, hospitals, schools and houses are essential for them to return to normal life. The poverty that is prevailing in southern Sri Lanka is a self-inflicted phenomenon, caused by the disastrous policies of the past governments (both the UNP and the SLFP) in dealing with the Tamil national conflict. In its fanatical drive to prosecute an unjust war against the Tamil people, the Sinhala state wasted all national wealth to a futile cause. The massive borrowings to sustain an absurd policy of `war for peace´ by the former government caused huge international indebtedness. The economic situation of the south has been further worsened by the mismanagement of state funds, bad governance and institutional corruption. Therefore, the conditions prevailing in the south are distinctly different from the northeast where the scale and magnitude of the infra-structural destruction is monumental and the poverty is acute. Ignoring this distinctive reality, your government posits poverty as a common phenomenon across the country and attempts to seek a solution with a common approach. This approach grossly under states the severity of the problems faced by the people in the northeast. The government´s `Regaining Sri Lanka´ document completely lacks any form of identified goals for the northeast. Statistics presented for substantiating the policy totally ignore the northeast and solely concentrate on southern Sri Lanka. However, this has been promoted as the national strategy to the international community to seek aid. It is evident from this that the government lacks any comprehensive strategy for serious development of the northeast. The poverty reduction strategy fails to address the poverty of the northeast as distinct from the rest. In seeking international assistance your government disingenuously speaks of reconstruction being needed in all areas, thereby masking the total destruction of the infrastructure of the northeast which has resulted from the militarist policies of the past three decades. As we pointed out above, the exclusion of the LTTE from critical aid conference in Washington, the non- implementation of the terms and conditions enunciated in the truce document, the continuous suffering and hardship experienced by hundreds of thousands of internally displaced Tamils, the aggressive Sinhala military occupation of Tamil cities and civilian settlements, the distortion and marginalization of the extreme conditions of poverty and deprivation of the Tamils of the northeast in the macro-economic policies and strategies of the government have seriously undermined the confidence of the Tamil people and the LTTE leadership in the negotiating process. Under these circumstances the LTTE leadership has decided to suspend its participation in the negotiations for the time being. We will not be attending the donor conference in Japan in June. While we regret that we were compelled to make this painful decision, we wish to reiterate our commitment to seek a negotiated political solution to the ethnic question. We also urge the government of Sri Lanka to restore confidence in the peace process amongst the Tamil people by fully implementing, without further delay, the normalization aspects of the ceasefire agreement and permit the immediate resettlement of the internally displaced people of the northeast. We also request the government to re-evaluate its economic development strategy to reconstruct the Tamil nation destroyed by war. End text.
12. (U) Minimize considered. WILLS"
24. 16.5.2003: Norwegian FM presses Tigers, but no sign of give yet
"C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000824 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT; NSC FOR E. MILLARD LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL E.O. 12958:
DECL: 05-16-13
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINS, CE, NO, JA, Human Rights
SUBJECT: Norwegian FM presses Tigers, but no sign of give yet; Latest re cohabitation stresses
Refs: Colombo 805, and previous (U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of Mission.
Reasons: 1.5 (b,d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Norwegian FM Petersen met with the Tigers on May15. Despite his best efforts, the Tigers did not say they will return to the talks, nor did they commit to attend the Tokyo donors conference. The Japanese Embassy has confirmed that it has received no further word from the Tigers re Tokyo. In other news, the cohabitation situation remains tense as the president and the PM continue to bicker. Until these snarls are cleared up, the GSL will continue to be in a bind. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) NORWEGIAN FM PRESSES TIGERS: Norwegian Foreign Minister Jan Petersen met with Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader V. Prabhakaran and other key LTTE officials on May 15. GoN Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen and Ambassador Hans Brattskar also participated in the meeting, which took place in the town of Kilinochchi in the Tiger-controlled Wanni area of north-central Sri Lanka. Petersen reportedly used the meeting to press the LTTE to return to the peace talks with the Sri Lankan government and to commit to attend the June donors conference in Tokyo. In response, the Tigers reiterated their position that unless immediate action was taken to address the humanitarian situation in the north, they would not go to Tokyo or resume participation in the peace talks. Voicing another of their long-standing demands, the Tigers also said that the GSL must take immediate steps to reduce the size of its security zones in Jaffna.
3. (C) JAPANESE MULL OVER TOKYO: In additional news re the peace process, Koji Yagi, Japanese Embassy poloff, told us May 16 that his government had not received any word from the Tigers re their attendance at the Tokyo conference. (Note: Per Reftels, Japanese Special Envoy Akashi had set May 14 as the deadline for the Tigers to reconsider their previous statements that they would not attend the Tokyo meeting.) Yagi said his embassy had heard that the LTTE might be planning to send Japan a letter requesting a postponement in the Tokyo conference so the GSL had ""time"" to meet Tiger demands. Queried as to what the GoJ´s plans were re the conference at this point, Yagi allowed that the issue was very problematic for his government. He said the GoJ continued to review what to do next.
4. (SBU) TAMIL POLITICIANS MEET THE LTTE: In other news re the peace track, a group of Tamil National Alliance (TNA) politicians met with the LTTE leadership in the Wanni on May13. After the meeting, a joint LTTE-TNA statement was issued that stressed the LTTE´s continued support of a negotiated political settlement of the dispute. Re the peace talks and the Tokyo conference, Mission has heard that the Tigers used the meeting with the TNA to reiterate their well-known stance that the GSL had to meet their demands before they agreed to cooperate.
5. (C) COHABITATION BICKERING CONTINUES: The latest news re Sri Lanka´s tense cohabitation situation is that President Kumaratunga has sent a letter to Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe on May 14 stating that she would not change her decision re the takeover of the Development Lotteries Board. (Note: Late last week, per Reftels, the president announced that she was taking over the lotteries board. The GSL has refused to implement her decision.) Further, she rejected the PM´s allegation that the takeover violated the Sri Lankan Constitution, asserting that she had acted in full conformity with the law. In terms of next moves in the tense situation, the PM is reportedly drafting a response to Kumaratunga´s latest missive. There are also reports that President Kumaratunga, in a bid to show she has control of the agency, is planning to call for an emergency meeting of the directors of the lotteries board soon.
6. (C) COMMENT: Until the snarls over the peace process and cohabitation are cleared up, the GSL will continue to be in a serious bind. The LTTE is clearly not in the mood to make things easy for it in terms of the peace track. In the meantime, the president is causing the GSL serious problems with respect to politics in the south. Even when things were going more smoothly, the GSL was overloaded enough. The weight of these added problems makes the overall challenge for the GSL that much larger. END COMMENT.
7. (U) Minimize considered. WILLS"
கருத்துகள் இல்லை:
கருத்துரையிடுக