6/17/2004 10:51
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001013
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR E. MILLARD
PLEASE PASS TOPEC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06-17-14
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, CE, NO, IN, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: Talks about Talks in Stasis while Norwegians
Ponder Next Moves
Refs: (A) Colombo 983, and previous
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b,d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: The LTTE showed no flexibility on
negotiation issues during Norwegian Ambassador´s June 16
visit to Kilinochchi. Both sides have rejected a
Norwegian compromise formulation on the negotiating
agenda. The situation in the East is somewhat improved
but remains troubled. The LTTE has postponed its
European meeting. The Tigers told NGOs and UN agencies
they want to coordinate assistance better. Norwegians
will hold discussions in India this week. Norwegians
will decide optimum time to resume their shuttle
efforts. END SUMMARY.
No Progress for Norwegians in Kilinochchi
----------------------------------------
2. (C) Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar briefed
fellow Co-Chair Ambassadors June 17 on his previous
day´s discussions with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) in Kilinochchi and on Norwegian peace
efforts in general. Brattskar said he had a 90 minute
meeting with LTTE political leader S.P. Thamilchelvam.
Briefing Thamilchelvam on the Brussels meeting,
Brattskar told him that the Co-Chairs were afraid of
drift in the peace process and were concerned about the
situation in the East. The positive side was that there
was great interest in Sri Lanka at a high political
level; the negative side was the impatience at lack of
progress. Thamilchelvam had spent considerable time
discussing the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA), which he
claimed the Government was violating in the East by
supporting Karuna´s forces. Thamilchelvam repeated the
familiar LTTE plaint that the Tamil people have
benefited from peace for the last two years but have
gained little else.
3. (C) Brattskar said he responded that both sides were
responsible for supporting the CFA. Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission (SLMM) head Trond Furuhovde would
travel to Kilinochchi next week for discussions on this
issue with the LTTE. (Brattskar commented that the
situation in the East was better than a few weeks ago,
but was still unstable.) In the meantime, the LTTE had
postponed its planned leadership trip to Geneva next
week for meetings with Tamil expatriate legal experts.
With no date yet set for talks, the LTTE saw no reason
to hold the discussions at this time.
4. (C) Ambassador asked Brattskar where the back and
forth on the talks stood, and described his own talk
last Friday with President Kumaratunga and her
description of the situation (see Reftel). Brattskar
said that both sides want Norway to continue its shuttle
diplomacy, but that right now nothing is happening. The
LTTE´s "seemingly inflexible position" of discussions
only on its Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA)
proposal had not allowed them to accept a Norwegian
proposal that the two sides sit down without any agenda
at all. At the request of both sides, the Norwegians
had tried to come up with a proposal for an agenda
bridging the positions of both sides, but neither had
agreed to their suggestion. At the moment, therefore,
the peace talks were in stasis. The Norwegians would
need to decide when to come up with a new proposal.
Brattskar noted that some people thought there would be
no movement until after the July 10 Provincial Council
elections. (Comment: We do not see a connection.) At
any rate, it was unlikely there could be any movement
until President Kumaratunga returned from her private
visit to the UK.
5. (C) Brattskar said that the deadlock came down to
the same old issues: lack of trust (especially by the
LTTE), and a feeling by the LTTE that agreement to
discuss final issues before an ISGA was agreed upon and
implemented would mean there would never be an ISGA.
LTTE Meets NGOs and UN Agencies
-------------------------------
6. (C) The LTTE had invited major NGOs and UN agencies
to Kilinochchi June 15 to meet with the Tiger´s Planning
and Development Secretariat (PDS). According to
participants in the meeting, the LTTE predictably asked
for direct funding, and were predictably turned down.
The Tigers described the PDS as a "focal point," not as
a proposed implementation agency. The Tigers wanted the
NGOs to "coordinate" with the PDS -- the NGOs said
coordination was fine as long as it did not mean
control. The Tigers said that they did not want any
type of joint development work with the Central
Government, but that they had no objection to projects
being implemented through the North East Provincial
Council, as is currently being done. The repeated their
opposition, however, to a revival of the North East
Reconstruction Fund (NERF) or a "NERF-like" structure,
which they see as a tactic to delay or permanently
replace an ISGA.
Norwegians to Delhi
-------------------
7. (U) Brattskar himself is leaving afternoon of June
17 to meet Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Helgesen in
New Delhi for talks with the new Indian government.
Brattskar said that reports in both Indian and Sri
Lankan press that current High Commissioner to Sri Lanka
Nirupam Sen would leave to become Perm Rep in New York,
and that Sen would be replaced by MFA Additional
Secretary for Administration Mrs. Nirupama Menon Rao
SIPDIS
were true.
COMMENT
-------
8. (C) The Norwegians are clearly feeling a bit
frustrated. Brattskar expressed (unusually) some
impatience with the LTTE and conceded that it was not
unreasonable for the GSL to expect some give from the
Tigers, who so far have not budged an inch from their
position on the negotiating agenda. The Norwegians seem
to feel now that it is best to take a breather before
getting back into the shuttle business. In the
meantime, Ambassador is planning an on-the-record
session with major newspaper editors next week to push
the message of Brussels: all sides need to move on
peace or risk losing donor attention and funding. END
COMMENT.
9. (U) Minimize considered.
LUNSTEAD
31.12.05.2009: SRI LANKA: PROCUREMENT OF LETHAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM NORTH KOREA AND IRAN
S E C R E T COLOMBO 000516
SIPDIS
STATE FOR ISN/CATR LOU GANEM, EAP/K, AND SCA/INSB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2019
TAGS: ETTC, MARR, MCAP, MOPS, PARM, PINR, PREL, KNNP, CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: PROCUREMENT OF LETHAL MILITARY
EQUIPMENT FROM NORTH KOREA AND IRAN
REF: SECSTATE 46946
Classified By: Charge d´Affaires James R. Moore Reasons 1.5(b)(d)
1. (S) Charge raised reftel points concerning possible GSL
purchase of lethal military equipment (LME) from North Korea
and Iran with Foreign Minister Bogollagama on May 11.
Bogollagama categorically denied that the GSL is attempting
to procure weapons or arms from either country. He also
underscored that the GSL is aware of international
restrictions concerning weapons sales from North Korea and
Iran, as well as the consequences for doing so. Bogollagama
stated that, at one point in the past, the GSL suspected
North Korea of supplying weapons to the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE). As a result, the GSL contacted the
Government of North Korea to discuss the issue. Bogollagama
did not further elaborate on the outcome of those discussions.
MOORE
32. 25.5.2006: Tokyo co-chairs pre-meetings
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000872
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PHUM, CE, NO
SUBJECT: TOKYO CO-CHAIRS PRE-MEETINGS
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead for reason 1.4 (d).
1. (C) Summary: GSL representatives admit that at
least some elements of armed forces may be
cooperating with irregular armed groups.
Government is trying to crack down on this, and is
also trying to develop a proposal for a political
settlement. EU will likely designate LTTE as
terrorist group on May 29 or 30, but there are
still internal divisions on how to handle this
issue, and this may affect discussions in Tokyo.
Norwegian Special Envoy Hanssen-Bauer is pushing
the GSL hard to examine its assumptions and is
looking for new ways to get the parties to talk to
each other. END SUMMARY
2. (U) Ambassador met May 24-25 with Peace
Secretariat Head Palitha Kohona, Defense Secretary
SIPDIS
Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Foreign Secretary
Palihakkara to discuss the upcoming Tokyo Co-
Chairs meeting. In addition, Co-Chairs Chiefs of
Mission met May 24 with visiting Norwegian Special
Envoy Jon Hanssen-Bauer, and Ambassador had
follow-on meeting next day with Netherlands
Ambassador Van Dijk.
3. (C) In all meetings, Ambassador began by noting
the importance of the Tokyo meeting. The Co-
Chairs had been formed in a different environment
with a specific task--to monitor the parties¥
compliance with the Tokyo Declaration which linked
development assistance with progress on the peace
process. That task no longer existed, and the Co-
Chairs should consider what their role should now
be. They would discuss in Tokyo what their
expectations were from both parties if they were
to continue successfully. He noted that the US
was developing further its proposal for two
international groups to crack down on Tiger
fundraising and weapons procurement.
Kohona: "Some Bad Things Happening"
-----------------------------------
4. (C) Peace Secretariat Head Palitha Kohona said
that the GSL strongly supported the proposed
initiatives on fundraising and weapons
procurement, and he believed that Japan did also.
Japanese Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi had told him
that Japan wanted to modify the role of Norway as
facilitator. Norway (and by extension the Co-
Chairs) should be "neutral but not impartial."
Ambassador said that in addition to stating that
the Tigers needed to give up violence and enter
the political process, the Co-Chairs would likely
repeat the recent statements by PDAS Camp that the
Government needed to find ways to address long-
term Tamil grievances and to protect the rights of
Tamils in the short-term. Kohona agreed that
"some bad things are happening" which the
Government needed to control. Some elements of the
security forces, he said, might be colluding with
Karuna and others.
5. (C) On the political front, Kohona said, he had
just spent two days in a retreat with Hanssen-
Bauer in Barcelona to go over the basics of the
peace process. Hanssen-Bauer had pushed him hard,
Kohona said, which was good. Regarding the Sri
Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), which has been
very forthright recently in its statements, Kohona
said that it was fair for the SLMM to criticize
the GSL when it did something wrong, but it should
not equate the Government and the Tigers.
Gotabaya Rajapaksa: Indians Pushing Hard
----------------------------------------
6. (C) Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapajksa
admitted to Ambassador that some elements of the
armed forces might be colluding with Karuna, and
that this had to stop. He said that the President
was adamant on this point and had made it strongly
to the service chiefs at a National Security
Council meeting that same morning. Gotabaya said
that Indian officials had pushed him hard during
his recent visit to New Delhi. National Security
Adviser Narayanan was very familiar with the
issue, since he had spent "over 500 hours" with
LTTE head Prabhakaran when Narayanan was working
in RAW. Naryanan and others had recommended
strongly that Sri Lanka adopt something like the
Indian model of governance, which had defused
India¥s own ethnic crises. The Indians also told
him that the GSL had to curb abuses against
Tamils, and had to offer the Tamils something
positive to work towards.
Palihakkara: GSL Serious about Human Rights
-------------------------------------------
7. (C) In a May 25 conversation with the
Ambassador and DCM, Foreign Secretary H.G.M.S.
Palihakkara said that President Rajapaksa is "very
keen" in mounting serious investigations into
possible security force human rights violations.
To that end, Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera
and Minister of Disaster Management and Human
Rights Mahinda Samarasinghe would later on May 25
hold the first meeting of a revived inter-
ministerial committee on human rights which would
provide oversight of security force conduct. "We
want to prevent security force misconduct while
investigating any that has already taken place,"
Palihakkara said. There would be a standing
working group under the committee, chaired by
Samarasinghe, which would include the service
commanders, Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa,
the Attorney General and others. At the same
time, the President¥s Secretary, Lalith Wiratunga,
would be meeting with the governor of the
Northeast Province and UNHCR to deal with those
who have been displaced by disturbances in the
Trincomalee area. That situation, Palihakkara
stated, is "still manageable" but needs to be
handled carefully, he said.
8. (C) Looking longer term, Palihakkara agreed
with the Ambassador that the GSL needs to take
steps to spell out a political future for the
country which would give a sense of belonging and
security to Tamils and Muslims. To that end, the
President has initiated a working group to put
flesh on the bones of his presidential campaign
commitment to "maximum devolution." Palihakkara
commented that it would be important to not get
caught up in labels like devolution or federalism.
"We should label it after we¥ve put it together."
9. (C) Palihakkara agreed with the Ambassador that
the May 30 co-chairs meeting in Tokyo would be an
important opportunity for the co-chairs to
determine what useful role they could play given
that their initial raison d¥etre really did not
exist anymore. "New thinking is needed."
Palihakkara commented that the "ancillary ideas"
of forming working groups to crack down on money
and weapons flows were welcomed by the government
which looked forward to feeding information to the
groups once they were formed. He said he hoped
the co-chairs would come out strongly against the
current violence and discuss ways to lessen it,
commenting that the cease-fire agreement is
intended to mean "no violence not regulated
violence."
10. (C) Palihakkara reiterated that the GSL
remains committed, despite the current
difficulties, to getting the Tigers "back to the
table" not just to discuss the cease-fire
agreement but also to talk about long-term
solutions (which made a public presentation on
"maximum devolution" all the more important). He
thanked the Ambassador for Secretary Rice¥s
response to Foreign Minister Samaraweera¥s letter
on the all-party congress and commented that while
it was easy to be dismissive of such exercises,
the congress had been very important in getting
the radical JVP to commit publicly to a number of
steps.
Hanssen-Bauer: Looking for Ways Forward
---------------------------------------
11. (C) Co-Chair Chiefs of Mission (US, Japan,
Norway, Netherlands representing EU Presidency,
and EC) met with visiting Norwegian Special Envoy
Jon Hanssen-Bauer evening of May 24. Hanssen-Bauer
said that his Barcelona meeting with Kohona was
intended to help the GSL think through its
strategy, and to push the GSL on what it could
offer for a political deal. Hanssen-Bauer would
see President Rajapaksa on Friday (after visiting
the Tigers in Kilinocchi on Thursday) and would
try to take these ideas further then.
12. (C) Hanssen-Bauer said that as an interim
confidence building measure, he was considering
inviting the parties to come to Oslo to discuss
the role of the SLMM, something they both seemed
interested in. This was especially important in
view of recent Tiger statements that the SLMM sea
wing should no longer ride on Sri Lankan Navy
vessels, and that land travel was now also
dangerous.
13. (C) Hanssen-Bauer asked COM¥s what they
thought should come out of the Tokyo meeting.
There was general consensus that the Co-Chairs
should state that they wanted to help the peace
process but could only do so successfully if the
parties were serious and took certain actions.
The LTTE would need to give up violence and
terrorism and enter the political process. The
Government would need to show that it recognized
Tamil grievances and was willing to take the
dramatic political steps needed to address them.
It would also need to ensure that Tamils were
protected. Unexpectedly, Netherlands Ambassador
Van Dijk said that a Co-Chairs statement should
not mention "terrorism," especially since EU
designation of LTTE as a terrorist group was
liable to be announced simultaneously with Tokyo
meeting on May 29 or 30. Van Dijk¥s position
seemed to surprise everyone, and Ambassador
strongly refuted it.
EU Inside Baseball
------------------
14. (C) Van Dijk called Ambassador May 25 and
asked to get together to talk the issue through.
Van Dijk (please protect) told Ambassador that
there were still deep divisions within EU on this
subject. France and Italy had objected to the
listing on procedural grounds, because they
thought they were being pushed into it by the US.
When that objection was dealt with, the Nordics
still objected on substantive grounds. They
insisted that a listing be accompanied by a
statement which mentioned the failings of both the
Government and the LTTE. He also said that EC
Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner and her colleague
Herve Jouanjean (who will represent the EC at
Tokyo) had pushed for a lesser action than
listing--some type of targeted sanctions--but had
lost. As a result, Van Dijk predicted, Jouanjean
could be difficult at Tokyo. Ambassador said he
believed there was no way we could accept a Tokyo
statement which did not mention the need for the
Tigers to give up terrorism, and van Dijk
eventually agreed there should be some way to do
that.
COMMENT
-------
15. Several things strike us from these meetings.
For one, the GSL seems to have gotten the message
that it must do something to prevent abuse of
Tamils, and also to think seriously about what a
long-term solution would look like. We were
particularly struck by the turnaround in Gotabaya
Rajapaksa. Previously he would strenuously deny
any connection between the GSL and the Karuna
group--now he admits it is probably occurring. We
are favorably impressed by Hanssen-Bauer, who is
bringing both imagination and structure to the
peace process and the work of the Co-Chairs. It
seems certain that the EU will designate the LTTE,
but it is still in disarray internally. Van Dijk
is excitable and not always accurate in his
predictions, but we may have to work hard on the
EU in Tokyo to make any statement meaningful. In
the end, Kohona is right: we can and should
criticize both sides, but we should not equate
them.
LUNSTEAD
33. 23.01.2006: AMBASSADORS CALL ON DEVELOPMENT MINISTER SOLHEIM
C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000072
SIPDIS
FOR D AND P
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2016
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, CE, SU, NO
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR´S CALL ON DEVELOPMENT MINISTER SOLHEIM
Classified By: Ambassador Benson K. Whitney, Reason 1.4 b and d.
1. (C) Summary. The Ambassador made his introductory call on International Development Minister Erik Solheim January 19 and discussed Solheims upcoming trip to Sri Lanka, the state of play in Sudan, and the Ministers development priorities. Solheim stressed that he is eager to cooperate with the United States, noting that there is only so much Norway can do to promote peace around the world. Ultimately, U.S. pressure is usually needed to consolidate any process, Solheim commented. Essentially, Solheim envisions Norway having a "complementary role" to U.S. efforts. Solheim spoke highly of Deputy Secretary Zoellicks in-depth knowledge of Sudan and praised the United States for achieving the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Solheim welcomed the Ambassadors suggestion that we not only continue the close cooperation on Sri Lanka and Sudan but also identify new areas where we can work together to advance peace and development, although he did not see an increased Norwegian role in the Caucasus. Solheim bluntly explained that Norway needs to be cautious in its approach to the Caucasus given that it is Russias backyard. End summary.
Sri Lanka: Expectations for Solheim Trip "Too High" - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2. (C) Solheim, who is traveling to Colombo January 23-26 (with a planned stop in New Delhi on his way back to Oslo), commented that expectations in the Sri Lankan press have gotten way out of hand -- as if his visit would "save" the country. Solheim remarked that ironically, the same people who only two months ago were bad mouthing Norway and wanted to end the Norwegian mediation role were now counting on Solheim to get the peace process back on track. The Minister outlined two basic objectives for his visit: 1) "stabilize the ceasefire" and 2) meet the President in his new capacity with a view to getting him to fully understand how he can advance talks with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Solheim explained that he wants to get a recommitment to the cease-fire, reduce violations, and move the country away from the brink of war. He added, that while he knows the President well and thinks highly of him, Rajapaksa in his view is unfamiliar with the complexities of the ethnic issues and needs to learn how to best move the peace process forward. Solheim intends to provide Rajapaksa the "LTTE perspective." On the question of getting the Sri Lankan Government and LTTE to the table, Solheim said that he hoped the parties would agree soon to a venue in Europe. While not ruling out Oslo, Solheim said that places like Sweden, Finland or Switzerland would be better. Solheim noted that he looked forward to comparing notes and discussing how best to advance the peace process with U/S Burns when they meet in Colombo.
Sudan: Norway Appreciates U.S. Role - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3. (C) Solheim was effusive in his praise for Deputy Secretary Zoellick. Not only was Solheim impressed with the
SIPDIS Deputys knowledge of Sudan but also that it was evident that he follows the issue day-to-day -- clearly reflecting the high priority the U.S. puts on Sudan. Solheim commented that without the United States, there would not have been a CPA and that now the U.S. and Norway need to continue to coax both parties, Khartoum and the SPLM, to continue to make progress. He remarked on the desperate state of the South, no roads, no infrastructure; noting that it was important that peace yield dividends. With the loss of Dr. Garang, the SPLM needs to consolidate its power and that is where Norway will focus its efforts. Solheim remains concerned about what he referred to as the "spoilers," i.e., paramilitary groups such as the Lords Resistance Army, and the situation in Darfur. Solheim added that the situation in Sudan remains "dangerous," stressing that it will require continued intense attention. Solheim thanked us for supporting Tom Vraalsen for leader of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, remarking that without the U.S. it would not have happened. Vraalsen is a good man, he added, and an expert on Sudan.
4. (C) On Darfur, Solheim believes the humanitarian situation has improved but that security remains a difficult problem. Solheim praised Deputy Secretary Zoellick for his efforts to force the various guerrilla groups to adopt serious positions in peace negotiations, noting that the situation will not improve until people feel safe to return to their homes.
No Global Strategy - - - - - - - - - -
5. (C) Responding to the Ambassadors question as to where Solheim saw Norway concentrating its development efforts under the new Stoltenberg government, Solheim readily acknowledged that he did not have a global strategy. In fact, Solheim said Norway was prepared to help anywhere where parties in conflict would want Norwegian participation. The Ambassador suggested that perhaps Norway could do more to advance democracy and stability in the Caucasus. Solheim bluntly replied that Norway had to be careful about getting involved in the Caucasus for fear of upsetting the Russians. Solheim noted that as a neighbor to Russia, Norway needs to proceed carefully in the Russian sphere of influence and all but ruled out any significant engagement in the Caucasus. That said, the rest of the world is game and we should consider where we can do more together.
Comment - - - -
6. (C) It is a ironic that despite being a minister from the far-left Socialist Left Party, Solheim (after FM Stoere), is the cabinet member most interested in working with us. One big reason for this is that his experience working with us on Sri Lanka has been extremely positive; another is that he realizes that he can do more as a peace broker if he has the U.S. as a closer. We believe Solheim can continue to be a good partner and that we should seize opportunities to engage him in areas where we think he can contribute, particularly given Norways deep aid pockets. It is clear that Solheim sees himself more as someone who will push peace initiatives than run development assistance programs.
7. (C) We have been pushing Norway to do more in the Caucasus for some time but to no avail. Solheims direct reply on concerns over alienating Russia is the first time we have been told the real reason. Norwegian officials are always quick to point to their excellent ties to Russia but rarely come out and say that they want to be careful not to irritate the bear. Privately, however, Norwegians acknowledge that they remain concerned over Russia and worry about some day returning to having an unfriendly neighbor -- hence the importance they place on NATO and their interest in making sure the United States becomes engaged on High North issues. Norways objective is to ensure that the U.S. is available and ready to help reign in any Russian aggressiveness/misbehavior in the Barents region. WHITNEY
34. 11.4.2006: : "Grim" prospects for Sri Lanka peace talks
C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000467
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2016
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, CE, NO
SUBJECT: "GRIM" PROSPECTS FOR SRI LANKA PEACE TALKS
Classified By: Acting Pol/Econ Chief Doug Apostol, Reasons 1.4(b) and (
d)
1.(U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 3.
Summary and Action Request
--------------------------
2.(C) Norwegian Special Envoy Jon Hanssen-Bauer hosted a Sri
Lankan Co-Chair representative meeting at the MFA on April
11. Hanssen-Bauer outlined the current situation in advance
of the scheduled April 19 Geneva conference (so-called
"Geneva Two") between representatives of the Sri Lankan
Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
Calling prospects of the conference occurring as "grim,"
Hanssen-Bauer noted issues (and internal pressures) dividing
both parties. In addition, he believes recent explosions
(likely the work of the LTTE) and the assassination of a Sri
Lankan official by the rival LTTE faction Karuna further
fueled existing tensions which would forestall the
forthcoming conference. After the Co-Chair representative
meeting, Hanssen-Bauer met alone with Pol/Econ Officer and
candidly revealed that Geneva Two will likely be postponed,
if not canceled. He questioned the Sri Lankan President¥s
grasp of the situation and/or his intentions. The Special
Envoy voiced apprehension about the Janatha Vimukthi Peremuna
(JVP) efforts to demonize Norway through negative propaganda,
which he felt would increase should Geneva Two not take
place, as planned. Finally, he noted the LTTE political
leadership faced internal military pressures, which could
affect Geneva Two moving forward.
3.(C) Hanssen-Bauer plans on releasing a statement
encouraging the parties to continue honoring existing Geneva
commitments and move forward with the Geneva Two meeting. He
is encouraging other Co-Chairs to release similar messages as
soon as possible. Post therefore requests the Department
consider issuing a statement urging the parties to attend the
planned Geneva Two meeting and recognize existing cease-fire
obligations.
Sri Lankan President in Delicate Balancing Act
--------------------------------------------- -
4.(C) Hanssen-Bauer believes that GSL President Rajapaksa
must balance internal political pressures (in addition to
those from rival parties) in any determination to continue
the peace process. Successful Geneva Two talks would improve
the President¥s southern power base (and may influence him
pushing for early elections).
LTTE Sending Mixed Messages
---------------------------
5.(C) Hanssen-Bauer finds mixed messages from the LTTE.
Although the LTTE indicates it wants to go beyond cease-fire
talks and eventually discuss other issues with the GSL (e.g.
economic development and democracy building), the first LTTE
issue is a guaranty of security for the Geneva-bound LTTE
delegation, which Rajapaksa has given. Hanssen-Bauer finds
the LTTE¥s greatest issue is for the GSL to disarm/disband
the Karuna faction. The LTTE feels that the GSL is "shutting
its eyes" to Karuna¥s operations, and speculates that Karuna
may be used by the GSL as a weapon in a war against the LTTE.
The LTTE concludes that the GSL armed forces, in addition to
the Karuna paramilitary forces, could defeat the LTTE
militarily.
6.(C) In addition, the LTTE asserts that the government¥s
failure to disarm/disband military groups (particularly
Karuna in the east) is a direct violation of the first Geneva
talks. According to Hanssen-Bauer, nothing has been done by
the GSL to address this LTTE issue. The Special Envoy feels
that the LTTE would accept the containment of the Karuna
faction (and not press for disbanding Karuna) as a
precondition for the LTTE proceeding with Geneva Two.
7.(C) Finally, the LTTE Central Committee seeks the GSL¥s
assistance in arranging a LTTE pre-Geneva "strategy meeting"
to be held in Kilinochichi. Rajapaksa has refused to offer
military transport to bring LTTE forces to Kilinochichi,
which Hanssen-Bauer suspects is a result of the President¥s
perceived need to show that he is not "soft" to political
rivals. Earlier GSL governements have provided such military
transport. Hanssen-Bauer noted that the LTTE could be asked
to go to Geneva Two without the Central Committee meeting,
but the result will create a "negative" atmosphere in Geneva.
Norway supports the Central Committee meeting, viewed as a
means of preventing the LTTE¥s isolation (and resort to
violence).
8. (C) Hanssen-Bauer spoke at length about his concern of
increased violence by the LTTE, specifically three incidents
of claymore mine attacks (most recently today). The
LTTE-sponsored attacks are apparently retaliation for the
Karuna-sponsored assassination of Vanniasingham Vigneswaran,
a moderate Tamil politician in Trimcomalee.
Frustrated Norwegians Resolved to Move Forward
--------------------------------------------- -
9.(C) Although Hanssen-Bauer is concerned with the recent
acts of violence, he impressed upon Co-Chair representatives
the need to move forward. Prior to the recent claymore
attacks, the LTTE advocated postponing Geneva Two. In his
view, the GSL now thinks the LTTE must go to Geneva,
particularly given Canada¥s listing of the LTTE as a
terrorist organization. Norway will issue a statement today
urging the parties to go to Geneva, and welcomes similar
statements form Co-Chair countries. The statement will
essentially provide that Norway encourages the parties to
meet face-to-face and halt tensions, but such decision must
be that of the GSL and LTTE themselves.
10.(C) The Norwegians view a constructive conversation at
Geneva Two as a means to defuse the charged climate. He
viewed any LTTE postponement of Geneva Two as likely leading
to the LTTE being recognized by the EU as a terrorist group.
Most importantly, he restated that the LTTE must cease its
violence. He informed the GSL that it must comply with its
existing Geneva obligations (including honoring the
cease-fire).
11.(C) Admittedly frustrated by both the GSL and LTTE demands
on Norway, Hanssen-Bauer has reminded them that Norway¥s role
is limited as a facilitator and, if "they are serious," both
the parties should enable each other to attend Geneva Two.
He noted that "Norway cannot make the meeting happen if the
GSL and LTTE do not want it to happen." Hanssen-Bauer,
stating that the atmosphere was "grim today, and hopefully
positive tomorrow" felt that if the parties do not meet on
April 19, he will advocate for a postponement, and not a
cancellation.
"Low-key Statements" Requested from Co-Chairs
---------------------------------------------
12.(C) When pressed by the Japanese Ambassador, Hanssen-Bauer
envisioned any supportive statements from the Co-Chairs as
being both "low-key" and "outside the public eye." These
statements would be directed only to the parties involved,
and should stress the importance of Geneva Two. The parties
should thus meet to defuse violence and further implement the
existing cease-fire agreement.
Parties Need to Get Their Acts Together
----------------------------------------
13.(C) Following the Co-Chairs representative meeting,
Hanssen-Bauer met privately with Pol/Econ Officer. The
Special Envoy started the meeting by praising Ambassador
Lunstead¥s efforts in Colombo (particularly regarding the
LTTE¥s military transportation requests). The Special Envoy
is troubled that President Rajapaksa is either consistently
uninformed or not forthcoming. He also voiced concerns that
the LTTE political leadership is facing increasing pressures
from the LTTE military leadership. Hanssen-Bauer seemed
particularly concerned about the JVP, despite its recent
election losses. He believes that postponing or canceling
Geneva Two will be seen as a JVP victory, which has stepped
up its anti-Norwegian propaganda efforts. With the recent
elections, Hanssen-Bauer states that the parties have not had
time to "get their acts together" and focus on issues leading
up to Geneva Two. He concludes that Geneva Two will be
postponed, or even perhaps canceled. The question remains as
to which party will actually cancel/postpone the conference.
Visit Oslo¥s Classified website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/oslo/index.cf m
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