"C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 002337 SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT, EUR/NB; NSC FOR E. MILLARD E.O. 12958:
DECL: 12-20-12
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, ECPS, CE, NO, External Relations, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: Import of radio equipment for Tamil Tigers sparks controversy for GSL and Norwegian facilitators Ref: Colombo 1891 (U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of Mission. Reasons 1.5 (b, d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: The recent import of radio equipment for the LTTE has stirred controversy, with critics asserting that the government and the Norwegian facilitators have gone too far in pleasing the Tigers. In response, the GSL says it assisted in the import of the equipment in exchange for the LTTE´s agreement to work within broadcasting regulations. The Norwegians underscore that they were working to further the peace process at GSL request. The incident has left a bad taste in everyone´s mouth. At the same time, it is important not to miss the fact that this was an instance where the Tigers paid heed to government regulations, something they never did in the past. END SUMMARY. Import of Radio Equipment
-------------------------
2. (SBU) The recent import of radio equipment into Sri Lanka for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has stirred controversy. The equipment in question was brought into Colombo harbor last month in a shipping container. Because the consignment was for the Norwegian Embassy, no duty was paid. The Norwegian Embassy has confirmed that it turned the consignment over to the GSL´s Peace Secretariat, which then passed the items over to the LTTE with the assistance of the Defense Ministry. At some point in this process, the LTTE´s radio station, the ""Voice of the Tigers,"" was legalized by the GSL as a private entity and given permission to broadcast.
3. (SBU) (((Note: It is not exactly clear what sort of radio equipment the LTTE was importing, but it is believed to have consisted of items that would allow the Voice of the Tigers radio to upgrade its FM capability. At this time, the Voice of the Tigers has very limited FM and short-wave capabilities, allowing the station to be dimly heard in parts of the north and east -- See Reftel for additional background. Some press reports state that the FM-upgrade equipment cost about USD 90,000 and that the equipment was bought in Singapore. It is not clear what range the new equipment will allow the Voice of the Tigers to have. The Indian government reportedly has expressed concerns to the GSL that the equipment will allow LTTE broadcasts to reach Tamil Nadu. End Note.))) Controversy Erupts ------------------
4. (SBU) When word of the equipment import leaked out, critics pounced on the GSL and the Norwegians accusing them of going too far to please the Tigers. The radical, Sinhalese chauvinist Janantha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) party was particularly vociferous, asserting that the government was helping sponsor the LTTE´s ""propaganda"" campaign. (Note: Many Sri Lankans are allergic to the mere mention of the Voice of the Tigers: the station has broadcast some pretty bloodcurdling stuff in the past, including salutes to the LTTE´s terrorist acts.) Some newspapers criticized the government for undertaking the import effort in ""secret."" Norway was particularly hard hit, with critics asserting (in wildly inaccurate fashion -- see below) that the GoN -- acting of its volition -- was importing equipment for the LTTE in an effort to save the group from paying duties to the legitimate government. GSL, Norwegian Response -----------------------
5. (C) In response to the flak, the government stressed that it was allowing the import of the equipment because the LTTE had agreed to accede to GSL broadcasting regulations. Ambassador Bernard Goonetilleke, the chief of the Peace Secretariat, told us that this was an important concession by the LTTE because for the first time the group had conceded that its radio station should follow GSL-set procedures like all other stations in the country. In any case, Goonetilleke noted, the Tigers could have tried to import the equipment illegally, as they have done in the past. If they had done so successfully, the government would not have had any leverage over their broadcasting capabilities, which it now has to some degree.
6. (C) For their part, the Norwegians, who have largely kept mum in public, have told us that they were only working to further the peace process at GSL request. Norwegian Ambassador Westborg told us that the Sri Lankan government had specifically requested his Embassy´s assistance several months ago. The GoN only agreed to help if the equipment was provided to the Peace Secretariat -- and not directly to the LTTE. Press reporting to the effect that the Norwegian government was out to assist the LTTE by undermining GSL authority was an outright falsehood, he emphasized.
COMMENT -------
7. (C) The incident has left a bad taste in everyone´s mouth. The Norwegians, who have come under so much criticism from anti-peace process elements, feel particularly aggrieved at the charges. The GSL admits that it did a poor job of communicating what it was doing. This failure, in turn, helped set up the Norwegians for criticism. Overall, while the incident did not really do too much damage to the peace process, its handling provided skeptics of the process some ammunition. At the same time, it is important not to miss the fact that this was an instance where the Tigers paid heed to government regulations, something the group never did before the peace process was launched. END COMMENT.
8. (U) Minimize considered. WILLS"
09. 1.8.2002: GSL minister cautiously optimistic on direction of peace process based on meeting with Tiger spokesman
"C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001422 SIPDIS NOFORN DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL; NSC FOR E. MILLARD E.O. 12958:
DECL: 08-01-12
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINR, PREL, PARM, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: GSL minister cautiously optimistic on direction of peace process based on meeting with Tiger spokesman
Refs: (A) Oslo 1742; (B) Colombo 1391 (U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills.
Reasons: 1.5 (b,d).
1. (C/NF)
Summary: In a July 31 meeting, Milinda Moragoda, a senior GSL minister, provided the Ambassador a detailed readout of his recent talks with Anton Balasingham, the spokesman of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The atmospherics were excellent, he related. On substantive issues, productive discussions were held on many topics, including the scope and timing of proposed negotiations, and ceasefire pact implementation. The LTTE side also sounded out Moragoda about the PM´s recent visit to the U.S. Overall, the London meeting seems to have provided a solid foundation for next steps in the peace process. End Summary. ----------------- Meeting in London -----------------
2. (C/NF) In a July 31 meeting with the Ambassador, Milinda Moragoda, a senior GSL minister, provided a detailed readout of his July 27 talks with Anton Balasingham, the LTTE spokesman. The meeting took place at the Norwegian Embassy in London. Moragoda was the only GSL representative present. Balasingham and his (Australian) wife, Adele, represented the LTTE. Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen, Special Envoy Erik Solheim, Norwegian Ambassador to Sri Lanka Jon Westborg, and Norwegian MFA official Lisa Golden were also present at the meeting as observers. (Note: Ref A contains Golden´s readout of the meeting. Her remarks track with Moragoda´s.) --------------------- Positive Atmospherics ---------------------
3. (C/NF) Moragoda said the atmospherics of the meeting were excellent. The Tigers had requested the meeting and they seemed to want to make it work. Balasingham gave the impression that he wanted to settle differences. Throughout the meeting, he seemed ""sincere, amiable, flexible."" He was much easier to deal with and less dogmatic than Moragoda had thought he would be. He was even ""disarming."" At one point in the discussion, for example, Balasingham jokingly (and accurately) used the term ""extortion"" in referring to his organization´s so-called ""taxation"" policies. It was possible, Moragoda allowed, that Balasingham was being ""duplicitous"" and ""putting on an act"" in order to gain some sort of advantage in the talks. If that was the case, Balasingham did his best to hide any such ulterior motives. ---------------------------- Discussion re Proposed Talks ----------------------------
4. (C/NF) On matters of substance, the talks were quite productive, according to Moragoda. He noted that there was a brief discussion of when proposed face-to-face high-level negotiations between the GSL and the LTTE might be held. Moragoda´s general impression was that the talks might kick off at some point in September or October, but it was still not clear and there had been no agreement on the issue. (Note: The two sides have already agreed that the venue of the proposed talks will be Thailand.)
5. (C/NF) The two sides also discussed the scope of possible negotiations. Balasingham seemed intent that the proposed talks focus primarily on the setting up of an interim council for the north and east, as opposed to focusing on a final settlement of the dispute. He specifically said the LTTE did not want ""countless lawyers"" being involved in the talks. That would only complicate matters. Moragoda replied that the GSL wanted all issues to be on the table. He also told Balasingham, however, that it would be possible for certain issues -- including the interim council -- to be dealt with more quickly than other, so-called ""core issues."" Balasingham seemed relieved to hear this. (Note: Moragoda told the Ambassador that Ambassador Westborg had mentioned to him the best way forward regarding an interim administration may be to revive the ""north-east council"" structure. The council -- a product of the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan accord -- is no longer active, but is already codified in the 13th amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution. End Note.)
6. (C/NF) In an interesting aside on the LTTE´s long- term objectives, Balasingham told Moragoda that the Tigers were mulling over ideas such as ""internal autonomy, federalism and confederalism."" Moragoda thought that this was positive in that Balasingham had not mentioned the word ""separatism."" He admitted that he was not sure what the LTTE might mean by these terms, however, as they were all subject to various interpretations. -------------------- Other Issues Covered --------------------
7. (C/NF) Moragoda said there was also a constructive give-and-take on a wide variety of additional subjects related to the peace process, including: -- Ceasefire Accord Implementation: Balasingham stressed that it was important that the Sri Lankan government adhere to the terms of the February ceasefire accord. He indicated that the matter was not a ""deal breaker,"" however -- the LTTE just wanted to see more progress. In particular, the Sri Lankan military had to do a better job of vacating temples and schools. In addition, the LTTE was concerned about the ""high security zones,"" the large swaths of the north and east currently controlled by the Sri Lankan military. These areas should be made smaller, so that Tamil civilians had increased access to public lands. Moragoda replied that the government would look into the issue, although the zones were technically permitted under the ceasefire accord. -- Sea-related Issues: Balasingham told Moragoda that the LTTE was concerned that Sri Lanka Naval (SLN) vessels were transiting too close to LTTE shore-based positions off the Mullaitivu region on Sri Lanka´s northeast coast. LTTE guns had a range of up to 10 miles in that area. It was important that the SLN not spark an incident. The LTTE had also recently purchased trawlers in India and was using them to fish. The GSL should allow this activity. Moragoda replied that the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) should look into these issues; that was what the group was there for. The issue of transit by LTTE boats was also discussed. The LTTE had backed off its formerly hard-line stand. It now seemed willing to accede to a compromise formulation developed by the SLMM that would allow less than fully armed LTTE cadre to travel via LTTE boats. LTTE boats could also carry a specified amount of ammunition for their fixed guns, per the SLMM proposal. -- LTTE Cadre Held Prisoner: Balasingham also requested that LTTE personnel held prisoner by the government be released as soon as possible. Moragoda said he would look into the matter. (Note: Balasingham estimated that the GSL held hundreds of its cadre prisoner. Moragoda said he had been told by GSL contacts that the number was less than a hundred.) -- LTTE request re Banking: On behalf of LTTE financial chief ""Thamil Enthy,"" Balasingham requested that the government open up banks that would provide loans to farmers and others living in Tiger-controlled areas. This would help increase economic activity in the area. Moragoda told Balasingham he would review this. He noted to the Ambassador that he was checking on whether a defunct GSL-backed micro-credit bank could be revived in order to focus on this matter. -- Muslim Issues: Balasingham complained that Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) leader Rauf Hakeem had been asked by the LTTE to keep in touch with LTTE eastern commander Karuna. Hakeem, however, continued to demand that his only LTTE interlocutor be the group´s leader, V. Prabhakaran. This was a problem and was leading to a breakdown in LTTE-SLMC relations. In fact, the LTTE was increasingly avoiding the SLMC altogether and dealing directly with other Muslim groups. ------------------- Query re U.S. Visit -------------------
8. (C/NF) The LTTE side also wanted to know about Prime Minister Wickremesinghe´s July 21-25 visit to the U.S., with Adele Balasingham specifically asking about the PM´s meeting with President Bush. Moragoda replied that President Bush had given the PM his full vote of confidence and had expressed support for a negotiated solution of the conflict. (Anton) Balasingham commented that this was fine with the LTTE, as the group understood that the U.S. and India had key roles to play in the peace process. Moragoda briefly mentioned U.S. assistance on military matters, commenting that a more secure Sri Lankan military would only benefit the peace process. ---------------------- Balasingham´s Schedule ----------------------
9. (C/NF) The London meeting wrapped up with a brief discussion of Balasingham´s schedule. Balasingham said he would be in London until mid-August (apparently his mother-in-law was in town). He planned to travel to Oslo around August 15 to give a speech. He wanted to travel to Canada at some point, too, but it was not clear whether the Canadian government would permit him to visit. Around August 20, he planned to travel to Sri Lanka to visit the LTTE leadership in the north. Balasingham noted that in doing this he would like to transit India, but it was not clear whether India would allow him in the country. (Note: The Indian government has previously given Balasingham a firm ""no"" in reply to his pleas to enter the country.) Adele Balasingham noted that her husband´s health was poor and that India should be helpful and offer him medical treatment if he needed it while in northern Sri Lanka. (Note: India has said no to this before, too.)
10. (C/NF) Moragoda told the Ambassador that he had invited Balasingham to transit Colombo on his way to the north, but Balasingham had turned down the offer, saying ""not at this time."" Moragoda added that he had heard from the Norwegian side that Helgesen might make a trip to Sri Lanka in late August, around the same time as Balasingham´s planned trip. ------- Comment -------
11. (C/NF) Overall, the London meeting seems to have provided a solid foundation for next steps in the peace process. Moragoda, for one, appeared confident that the talks had gone well. That said, he made clear that he did not want to make too much of the meeting and that he remained cautious, given the difficulty of reading the LTTE´s true intentions. Certainly, the meeting -- the highest-level GSL-LTTE contact in years -- was an important benchmark. The notion of high-level representatives of the GSL and the LTTE discussing issues face-to-face in a productive give-and-take is a new and positive development. In addition, the fact that the talks took place at all was important for the GSL in underscoring to Sri Lankans that its peace initiative still maintains traction and is not sliding backwards. End Comment.
12. (U) Minimize considered. WILLS"
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