"C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000824 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT; NSC FOR E. MILLARD LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL E.O. 12958:
DECL: 05-16-13
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINS, CE, NO, JA, Human Rights
SUBJECT: Norwegian FM presses Tigers, but no sign of give yet; Latest re cohabitation stresses
Refs: Colombo 805, and previous (U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of Mission.
Reasons: 1.5 (b,d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Norwegian FM Petersen met with the Tigers on May15. Despite his best efforts, the Tigers did not say they will return to the talks, nor did they commit to attend the Tokyo donors conference. The Japanese Embassy has confirmed that it has received no further word from the Tigers re Tokyo. In other news, the cohabitation situation remains tense as the president and the PM continue to bicker. Until these snarls are cleared up, the GSL will continue to be in a bind. END SUMMARY.
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2. (C) NORWEGIAN FM PRESSES TIGERS: Norwegian Foreign Minister Jan Petersen met with Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader V. Prabhakaran and other key LTTE officials on May 15. GoN Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen and Ambassador Hans Brattskar also participated in the meeting, which took place in the town of Kilinochchi in the Tiger-controlled Wanni area of north-central Sri Lanka. Petersen reportedly used the meeting to press the LTTE to return to the peace talks with the Sri Lankan government and to commit to attend the June donors conference in Tokyo. In response, the Tigers reiterated their position that unless immediate action was taken to address the humanitarian situation in the north, they would not go to Tokyo or resume participation in the peace talks. Voicing another of their long-standing demands, the Tigers also said that the GSL must take immediate steps to reduce the size of its security zones in Jaffna.
3. (C) JAPANESE MULL OVER TOKYO: In additional news re the peace process, Koji Yagi, Japanese Embassy poloff, told us May 16 that his government had not received any word from the Tigers re their attendance at the Tokyo conference. (Note: Per Reftels, Japanese Special Envoy Akashi had set May 14 as the deadline for the Tigers to reconsider their previous statements that they would not attend the Tokyo meeting.) Yagi said his embassy had heard that the LTTE might be planning to send Japan a letter requesting a postponement in the Tokyo conference so the GSL had ""time"" to meet Tiger demands. Queried as to what the GoJ´s plans were re the conference at this point, Yagi allowed that the issue was very problematic for his government. He said the GoJ continued to review what to do next.
4. (SBU) TAMIL POLITICIANS MEET THE LTTE: In other news re the peace track, a group of Tamil National Alliance (TNA) politicians met with the LTTE leadership in the Wanni on May13. After the meeting, a joint LTTE-TNA statement was issued that stressed the LTTE´s continued support of a negotiated political settlement of the dispute. Re the peace talks and the Tokyo conference, Mission has heard that the Tigers used the meeting with the TNA to reiterate their well-known stance that the GSL had to meet their demands before they agreed to cooperate.
5. (C) COHABITATION BICKERING CONTINUES: The latest news re Sri Lanka´s tense cohabitation situation is that President Kumaratunga has sent a letter to Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe on May 14 stating that she would not change her decision re the takeover of the Development Lotteries Board. (Note: Late last week, per Reftels, the president announced that she was taking over the lotteries board. The GSL has refused to implement her decision.) Further, she rejected the PM´s allegation that the takeover violated the Sri Lankan Constitution, asserting that she had acted in full conformity with the law. In terms of next moves in the tense situation, the PM is reportedly drafting a response to Kumaratunga´s latest missive. There are also reports that President Kumaratunga, in a bid to show she has control of the agency, is planning to call for an emergency meeting of the directors of the lotteries board soon.
6. (C) COMMENT: Until the snarls over the peace process and cohabitation are cleared up, the GSL will continue to be in a serious bind. The LTTE is clearly not in the mood to make things easy for it in terms of the peace track. In the meantime, the president is causing the GSL serious problems with respect to politics in the south. Even when things were going more smoothly, the GSL was overloaded enough. The weight of these added problems makes the overall challenge for the GSL that much larger. END COMMENT.
7. (U) Minimize considered. WILLS"
26. 15.3.2004: Norwegian Special Envoy Solheim reviews latest on LTTE split and discusses upcoming election
3/15/2004 11:33
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000456
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS
DEPARTMENT PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC
NSC FOR E. MILLARD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03-15-14
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, PTER, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: Norwegian Special Envoy Solheim reviews latest
on LTTE split and discusses upcoming election
Refs: (A) Colombo 446, and previous
- (B) Oslo 419
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b, d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: In a March 13 meeting with the four
local co-chairs (Japan, Norway, U.S. and the EU) and
again to a wider donor group on March 15, Norwegian
Special Envoy Erik Solheim discussed his latest visit to
Sri Lanka. Ambassador Lunstead participated in the
meetings. Most of Solheim´s comments focused on the
recent split in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) organization and Sri Lanka´s April 2
parliamentary election. Solheim´s visit appears to have
been mainly devoted to fact gathering on the new
complexities and uncertainties affecting the Sri Lankan
situation. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) MEETING WITH LTTE OFFICIALS: In March 13 and
March 15 meetings, which were attended by Ambassador
Lunstead, Solheim said he had met with S.P.
Thamilchelvam, the Tiger political chief, during a March
11 trip to LTTE headquarters in the Vanni region.
During the discussion, which centered around rebel
eastern commander Karuna´s recent break with the main
LTTE leadership (see Ref A), Solheim said Thamilchelvam
had emphasized repeatedly that the group wanted to
"peacefully" resolve the dispute with Karuna. Asserting
that Karuna was operating alone and that most eastern
cadre were "against" him, Thamilchelvam told Solheim
that the Tigers would try to undermine Karuna from
within by starving Karuna financially and encouraging
defections from his ranks. Thamilchelvam also blamed
Karuna for the two recent election-related
assassinations in the east (see Ref A). (Karuna has
placed blame for these killings on the LTTE´s
intelligence apparatus.) The Tigers also told Solheim
of their concern that no one interfere in the Karuna
situation. The group was steadfast that it was an
"internal matter" for the LTTE alone. (Separately,
during two meetings, Solheim said PM Wickremesinghe made
clear that the GSL would not get involved in the
situation between the LTTE and Karuna. The PM also said
that the government would avoid taking advantage of the
situation.)
3. (C) While in the Vanni, Solheim also said that he
had met with Pathuman, a high-ranking LTTE commander
from Trincomalee District. According to Solheim,
Pathuman looked "okay" and stated that he (Pathuman)
was still in command of the Trincomalee district.
(Solheim´s meeting with Pathuman effectively rebutted
recent press reports that the LTTE had "executed"
Pathuman because he was allegedly close to Karuna --
see Ref A.)
4. (C) In a March 11 visit to the eastern area of
Trincomalee, Solheim said that he had had a positive
meeting with Sri Lanka Army Major General Sunil
Tennekoon, the general in charge (GOC) of the
district. Tennekoon stated that the situation in
Trincomalee remained calm, despite newspaper reports
to the contrary. Local Tigers officials in
Trincomalee, for their part, told Solheim they were
happy that the Norwegian delegation was visiting
Trincomalee. According to the Tigers, the visit was
an important signal that the international community
remained engaged in Sri Lanka. Separately, Solheim
added that the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)
was continuing its work in the east, despite press
reports to the contrary. The only change was that
the SLMM was not entering the eastern areas held by
Karuna.
5. (C) Solheim told the co-chairs that the
Norwegians saw three possible outcomes to the Karuna
situation:
-- (1) the LTTE leadership undermines or kills
Karuna;
-- (2) the LTTE leadership strikes a deal with
Karuna, giving the rebel commander autonomy over the
eastern districts of Batticaloa and Ampara;
-- (3) Karuna becomes a GSL-supported "warlord."
(Solheim said this last possibility would be the most
unsettling for the peace process if it came to
fruition.)
6. (C) Solheim said Thamilchelvam also had discussed
donor assistance and the need to resolve the issue of
an assistance funds delivery mechanism. To the co-
chairs, Solheim stated that the Norwegians were
considering a model similar to the Afghan Fund.
7. (C) PARLIAMENTARY CAMPAIGN: In discussing the
April 2 parliamentary elections, Solheim noted that
the LTTE hoped the government would approve polling
sites either at the GSL´s crossing points into Tiger-
controlled area, or in the "no-man´s land" between
GSL- and LTTE-controlled areas. On this point, it
was not clear which alternative had been agreed to,
although the LTTE remains concerned that the Army
will not honor election plans and, in a repeat of the
December 2001 parliamentary elections, would largely
bar Tamils in Tiger-controlled areas from reaching
polling sites. If polling sites were approved for
either of these areas, the LTTE expected that the
Army would not be present, with the Sri Lanka police
instead providing security. According to Solheim,
Army officials in Jaffna and Trincomalee had stated
that the Tigers had agreed to polling sites at the
GSL´s crossing points. (Mission has heard reports
that the Sri Lankan Election Commissioner will
support holding the polling in "no-man´s land"
areas.)
8. (C) COMMENT: Solheim´s visit appears to have been
mainly devoted to fact gathering. Karuna´s decision to
separate himself from the main LTTE organization has
clearly made the overall situation that much more
complex. Moreover, there is great uncertainty over how
the Karuna matter will play out and over the upcoming
election. That said, the Norwegians still appear firmly
engaged, which is a significant positive. Their mettle
is clearly being tested in this confusing, volatile
period, however. END SUMMARY.
9. (U) Minimize considered.
LUNSTEAD
27. 15.4.2004: In meeting, Norwegian Ambassador reviews recent discussion with President on peace process
4/15/2004 10:24
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000644
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, INR/NESA; NSC FOR E. MILLARD
PLEASE PASS TOPEC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04-15-14
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: In meeting, Norwegian Ambassador reviews
recent discussion with President on peace process
Refs: Colombo 637, and previous
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b,d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Norway expects a formal request from
the GSL to continue its role as peace facilitator.
Norwegians think the new Sri Lankan Government needs to
realize it cannot make unilateral decisions on the
course of the peace process. No "Peace Team" in place
yet. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar briefed
Ambassador April 14 on the conversation he and Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission (SLMM) Chief Furuhovde had with
President Chandrika Kumaratunga late evening of April
10, following the delayed swearing-in of the new
cabinet. The meeting also took place as fighting
between forces of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) chief Prabhakaran and breakaway leader Karuna was
ongoing, before the collapse of Karuna´s rebellion (see
Reftels). Brattskar said that the President complained
that LTTE actions were a violation of the Ceasefire
Agreement (CFA) and seemed to want the SLMM to do
something immediately. Brattskar explained that the CFA
set out a procedure, and that the GSL would have to make
a formal complaint to the SLMM, which would then
investigate and make a judgment.
3. (C) The President said that she desired to restart
the peace talks as soon as possible. Brattskar said
that he told the President that when the previous
government took power, it had formally requested the
Norwegians to continue their facilitation role. Norway
expected to receive such a request from the new
government, with a description of what it expected
Norway to do. The President was surprised at this.
Brattskar then said that he explained to the President
that neither the GSL nor the LTTE could make unilateral
decisions about the talks. The two sides would have to
agree to any decisions. Brattskar told Ambassador (but
not the President) that the Norwegians, and Deputy
Foreign Minister Helgesen in particular, were disturbed
by an interview which new Foreign Minister Kadirgamar
had given to a local newspaper a few days ago in which
he had made several categorical statements, such as that
any new rounds of talks would be held only in Sri Lanka,
not in foreign locations, and also laying out what he
thought Norway´s role would be. Brattskar said that any
such decisions would have to be agreed by both sides and
should be discussed privately, not in the press. He
also expressed unease about statements by both
Kadirgamar and new Prime Minister Rajapakse that India
would have a new, and prominent, role to play in the
peace process. Again, this was something both sides
would need to agree on.
4. (C) Alluding to the then-ongoing LTTE infighting,
the President told Brattskar that she thought peace
talks only succeeded when one side negotiated from a
clear position of strength. (This position is probably
made moot by Karuna´s collapse.) Brattskar discussed
with her a number of different peace processes, but said
he did not think the LTTE could be pressurized in that
way. He told Ambassador that it reminded him of the
strategy the President had followed in the mid-90s of
"War for Peace," which had ended disastrously.
5. (C) Brattskar said it was also clear that the
President had not yet put together a "Peace Team" to
conduct the negotiations. She told him she would keep
the current Peace Secretariat, but change some of its
personnel. She did say that current Foreign Secretary
and also Peace Secretariat Head Bernard Goonetilleke
would be removed from both jobs.
6. (C) COMMENT: The charitable view of this is that
the new Government was unaware of the ways in which the
Peace Process has changed and become formalized over the
past two years, and will adjust to new realities. If it
does not, and tries to make unilateral changes and
decisions, there could be a rough road ahead. The
Norwegians, no doubt feeling a bit buffeted by criticism
of their role during the election campaign, are perhaps
being over-sensitive. Nonetheless, they have made a
useful point to the President that their role cannot
just be taken for granted.
7. (C) COMMENT (Continued): No one doubts the
President´s commitment to peace. What remains
questionable are: (1) whether she has the vision to
understand what changes a peace settlement will entail
for Sri Lanka and (2) whether she can deal with the
Process in a systematic, disciplined manner. The weak
nature of her government, beset on peace from within by
its JVP partners and from without by the Buddhist monks,
will make it all the harder. END COMMENT.
8. (U) Minimize considered.
LUNSTEAD
28. 9.6.2004: Recent meetings show the way forward for Sri Lanka peace process is troubled
6/9/2004 9:35
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000953
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR E. MILLARD
PLEASE PASS TOPEC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06-09-14
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, CE, NO, Political Parties, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: Recent meetings show the way forward for Sri
Lanka peace process is troubled
Refs: (A) Colombo 915, and previous
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b,d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Opposition Leader Wickremesinghe
thought the Co-Chairs statement was good, but that the
President and her government do not understand the
psychology of the LTTE, and are determined to begin
talks on the final ("hard") issues. He also thinks the
military is using LTTE rebel Karuna to attack the LTTE.
When pressed to support the peace process, he said that
the Government needs to make a statement laying out its
policy.
2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: Norwegian Ambassador
Brattskar says that the two sides are moving further
apart, rather than closer. The LTTE will meet with its
diaspora experts in Switzerland in mid-July. President
Kumaratunga called the Norwegian Foreign Minister to
complain that she had already made many concessions. No
one expects any movement until after the July 10
Provincial Council elections. END SUMMARY.
Ranil: She just does not understand.
------------------------------------
3. (C) Ambassador met with Opposition Leader (and
former Prime Minister) Ranil Wickremesinghe the evening
of June 7 to discuss the recent Co-Chairs meeting in
Brussels. Ranil said that he had read the Co-chairs´
statement and thought it was "good." At the moment, he
did not plan any action on the peace process: "She has
the mandate, not me." President Kumaratunga and Foreign
Minister Kadirgamar, he said, did not understand the
psychology of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE). "They only want to discuss an interim
administration. They will never agree to discuss final
issues now." He had discussed this with Kadirgamar, but
Kadirgamar had insisted that he wanted to take up hard
issues now. Ranil said that he had ignored some
transgressions by the LTTE because it was the only way
to keep negotiations going. The President did not
understand this.
4. (C) Ranil said that the Government was playing a
dangerous game because the Sri Lanka Army (Department of
Military Intelligence, "DMI") was using the breakaway
LTTE rebel Karuna to get back at the LTTE. Ranil said
he "knew" this was the case -- he had sources in the
military who told him so. This was another example of
the Government´s dangerous game.
5. (C) Ambassador said that the Co-Chairs statement was
directed at all parties in Sri Lanka. If the
international community were to keep its interest alive,
we expected everyone to support peace. Pressing the
point, Ambassador said that he thought comments such as
recent remarks by UNP spokesman G.L. Peiris that the
President´s efforts were a "sham" peace process were not
helpful. One could criticize what the President wanted
to do, Ambassador said, but should not imply that she
was not interested in peace. Ranil said that the
President and her ruling coalition needed to make a
clear policy statement on the peace process. (Comment:
The President is avoiding this because she could never
get her JVP coalition partners to go along with anything
reasonable.)
Norwegians: Getting worse, not better
-------------------------------------
6. (C) Ambassador met with Indian High Commissioner Sen
and Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar mid-day on June 8,
along with EU and Canadian Chiefs of Mission.
(Brattskar had arrived back from Oslo, where he had
stopped after Brussels, only that same morning.)
Brattskar said that the Norwegians were trying to put
together a statement which would allow talks to resume.
The Norwegians were in constant touch with both sides,
receiving messages from both, but unfortunately the
sides were moving farther apart. Each side was sending
"unhelpful clarifications." The Government insistence
on holding "parallel" talks on final settlement issues
was, Brattskar said, just a non-starter.
7. (C) Each side was afraid that giving in would
prejudice the final outcome. The LTTE had rejected the
plan to resurrect a NERF-like mechanism to disburse aid
because they felt if they did so, the Government would
never seriously discuss the LTTE´s Interim Self-
Governing Administration (ISGA). The Government did not
want to discuss the ISGA alone because it feared that if
an ISGA were set up, the LTTE would have no incentive to
discuss final issues. Brattskar said that President
Kumaratunga had called the Norwegian Foreign Minister
the day before to complain that she had made many
compromises, but the Tigers had not made any.
LTTE issues
-----------
8. (C) Sen said that he had heard that the GSL had been
using Karuna and his faction to get back at the LTTE,
but that the military had now been given orders to stop
providing assistance to Karuna. Brattskar said that the
LTTE was now preparing for a week-long meeting they
would hold in Switzerland beginning July 20. The
meeting would include the legal and constitutional
experts from the Tamil diaspora who had helped the LTTE
prepare their ISGA proposal.
Messy Political Situation
-------------------------
9. (C) All agreed that the current political situation
makes it particularly difficult to make progress:
-- The Government still does not have enough votes to
show a majority in Parliament. (See Septel for report
on June 8 altercation in parliament.)
-- The JVP faction within the government continues to
snipe at the peace process (see Reftels).
-- Pending Provincial Council elections on July 10, no
one wants to make a dramatic move.
10. (C) COMMENT: We believe that Ranil Wickremesinghe
heard the Ambassador´s message about not trying to take
political advantage by attacking the peace process.
Wickremesinghe made it clear, however, that he is not
about to lend support to the President. Ranil´s
analysis of the psychology of the Tigers, and the need
to induce them to participate in the talks may be
accurate. The President´s problem is that she directed
the electoral campaign against Ranil on the basis that
he gave in too easily to the Tigers -- now she has to
show that she is harder to budge. Combined with
Kadirgamar´s insistence on discussing final issues, the
result is a poisonous atmosphere.
11. (U) Minimize considered.
LUNSTEAD
29. 15.7.2003: Tigers still refusing request from monitors tovacate forward base
7/15/2003 2:48
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001262
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT
NSC FOR E. MILLARD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07-18-13
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PHUM, PINS, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: Tigers still refusing request from monitors to
vacate forward base; Another military informant killed
Refs: (A) FBIS Reston Va DTG 170326Z Jul 03
- (B) FBIS Reston Va DTG 150248Z Jul 03
- (C) Colombo 1256, and previous
(U) Classified by James F. Entwistle, Charge d´Affaires.
Reasons 1.5 (b, d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
(SLMM) has not yet been able to convince the Tamil
Tigers to vacate a base the group has established in the
east. The Tigers say the base is within their zone and
not in a GSL-demarcated area. In other peace process
developments, another military informant was killed late
July 17. The Tigers are almost certainly to blame. The
controversy over the base is causing strains in the
SLMM´s relationship with the Tigers. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) CONTROVERSY OVER TIGER BASE: The Norwegian-run
SLMM is becoming increasingly concerned over the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) organization´s
refusal to vacate a forward base the group has
established in the east. The base, which is variously
referred to as the "Wan Ela" or "Manrasakulam" camp, is
near Kinniya, a town located roughly 15 kilometers to
the southwest of Trincomalee city. It is not clear when
the LTTE established the base, but the group apparently
did so in the past year. The LTTE has reportedly taken
steps to enlarge the base in recent weeks. The base is
believed to contain several bunkers which are possibly
filled with arms and ammunition.
3. (C) Reacting to complaints from the GSL and local
Muslims, the SLMM began to investigate the LTTE´s
establishment of the base several weeks ago. (Note:
Kinniya has a large population of Muslims. Muslims, in
general, are very worried about any indications of
increased Tiger influence in the east -- see Ref C.)
According to Hagrup Haukland, the Deputy Chief of the
SLMM, the basic rule the monitors are using in examining
the dispute comes from the February 2002 ceasefire
agreement. Haukland said the agreement makes clear that
the military forces of the LTTE and the government
cannot expand their zones of control during the
ceasefire. After examining records and completing a
site survey of the base on July 16, the SLMM ruled that
the Tigers´ base was built after the ceasefire agreement
came into force and that it encroaches on government-
controlled territory.
4. (C) For their part, the Tigers have vociferously
denied that the base is in a government-controlled area.
In recent meetings with SLMM officials, including Chief
Tryggve Tellefsen, the LTTE´s political chief S.P.
Thamilchelvam has underscored that the Tigers have no
plans to vacate the area. Exasperated by the Tigers´
hard-line stance, Haukland has given several interviews
to the press in which he has lashed out at the LTTE,
asserting that the group must vacate the site as soon as
possible (see Refs A-B). Among other concerns, Haukland
has also complained that the LTTE is not allowing the
monitors access to sites in all the areas it controls.
In recent conversations with polchief Haukland asserted
that the monitors´ relationship with the Tigers is not
approaching the breakdown stage despite his harsh
comments. When asked about next steps, Haukland said
the SLMM would continue to try to convince the Tigers to
withdraw from the area through private and public
communications. (Note: The SLMM´s Tellefsen briefed
Prime Minister Wickremesinghe about the dispute in a
July 17 meeting.)
5. (C) ANOTHER INFORMANT SLAIN: In other peace process
developments, another military informant was killed late
July 17. The informant, a Muslim named Abdul Baheer
Fowzie, 38, was gunned down by two men at a site north
of Trincomalee city. The slaying of Fowzie appears to
be part of the spate of killings of military informants
and Tamil Tiger opponents that has gained pace in recent
months (see Ref C). The Tigers have not taken
responsibility for any of the killings, including that
of Fowzie. Given the seemingly organized nature of the
killings and the victims´ occupations and/or political
leanings, there is little doubt that the Tigers are
responsible, however.
6. (C) COMMENT: The controversy over the base near
Kinniya is sparking strains in the SLMM´s relationship
with the Tigers. In their public comments, there is
little doubt that the monitors are getting increasingly
exasperated with the Tigers. The SLMM essentially feels
that the LTTE is not living up to its part of the
ceasefire agreement bargain by acceding to the monitors´
rulings. The SLMM has made the Tiger leadership aware
of its concerns, and it is now up to Thamilchelvam and
others to react in a constructive manner. If the Tigers
do not play ball, the SLMM´s mandate will become
increasingly difficult to fulfill. END COMMENT.
ENTWISTLE
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கருத்துரையிடுக