11/29/2004 10:36
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001919
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR DORMANDY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2014
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: NORWEGIANS CONCERNED BY JVP-ORCHESTRATED CAMPAIGN
AGAINST THEM
REF: COLOMBO 1862
Classified By: James F. Entwistle, Deputy Chief of Mission. 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C) Summary. The Norwegians are increasingly concerned
by an ugly JVP-orchestrated campaign against their role in
the peace process. The situation is exacerbated by President
Kumaratunga,s reluctance to pull the JVP into line. The
Co-Chair consensus here is that a group call on the Foreign
Minister and/or the President to make clear our support for
Norway and to urge that the JVP,s role in the government be
clarified would be appropriate. End Summary.
2. (C) The Tokyo co-chair chiefs of mission were convened
November 29 by Japanese Ambassador Akio Suda. Norwegian
Ambassador Hans Brattskar and Dutch Ambassador Susan
Blankhart attended. DCM represented the U.S. Suda said he
had felt it wise for the co-chairs to meet and discuss the
increasingly ugly anti-Norwegian campaign being orchestrated
by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and turned the floor
over to Brattskar.
UGLY CAMPAIGN
-------------
3. (C) Brattskar said he and Oslo were becoming increasingly
concerned about and exasperated with the escalating
anti-Norwegian rhetoric (also directed against the Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission, "SLMM") which is clearly being
orchestrated by the JVP. Oslo is also "fed up" with the
GSL´s "lukewarm" response to the JVP campaign. Brattskar
shared copies of two documents. The first was a petition
handed over during a November 24 demonstration at the
Norwegian Embassy. The contents, Brattskar noted, were
fairly predictable: Norwegians too &friendly8 with the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the SLMM &does
nothing8 to prevent LTTE murders, etc. The interesting
parts, Brattskar noted, were the letterhead and signatories.
The petition from the &Forum of Political Parties and Civil
Organizations against Political Killings and Abductions8 was
signed by the anti-LTTE Tamil Eelam People´s Democratic Party
(EPDP), the JVP, the anti-LTTE Tamil Eelam People´s
Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), the JVP-aligned
National Bhikku Front, the National University Teachers,
Alliance and a few other small groups. There was also a
signature line for breakaway LTTE faction leader Karuna,s
party (the TIVM), although there was no signature. Brattskar
said he had no doubt that the exercise had been organized by
the JVP. He took a dim view of the fact that two member
parties (the EPDP and the JVP) of the ruling coalition had
signed the document.
4. (C) The second document was a letter (which the
Norwegians do not intend to make public) to Brattskar from
JVP Secretary General Tilvin Silva in response to Bratskar,s
efforts to meet with the JVP leadership in order to explain
the Norwegian role and the activities of the SLMM. (As noted
in reftel, Brattskar has seen several JVP personalities in
their ministerial roles but has not been able to obtain a
meeting with the political leadership.) The letter is indeed
insulting. It refers to Norway as &a relatively
insignificant country8 (Brattskar laughingly commented,
&They,re right about that!8) It accuses Norway of active
support and training for the LTTE Sea Tigers (an old canard
that resurfaces periodically in the media), of pursuing an
agenda of active support for the LTTE against the GSL
(&aiding and abetting Tiger terrorism in devious ways in the
name of facilitating peace and thus white washing crimes
against humanity including forced conscription of children8)
and participating in LTTE propaganda efforts. The letter
says, due to these &examples8 of Norwegian connivance with
the LTTE, &The Norwegian Government has thus openly
contravened the United Nations Resolution 1373 of 2001
relating to the suppression of terrorism.8 The letter
concludes with the statement that Norwegian actions
&demonstrate the total lack of our Government,s confidence
in you. In these circumstances, a meeting with you at this
stage will serve no useful purpose.8
ACTIVE CAMPAIGN AROUND THE COUNTRY
----------------------------------
5. (C) Brattskar stated that the JVP clearly is
orchestrating a campaign around the country. He had recently
taken separate trips to Hambantota in the deep south and to
Kandy and the &cultural triangle.8 On both trips, there
had been clear indications of such efforts and, Brattskar
said, many of those with whom he met described the JVP
campaign in detail. He also noted that the JVP member of
Parliament in Trincomalee had publicly stated he was
organizing a campaign against the SLMM office there, which
Brattskar described as &worrying.8
GOVERNMENT,S POSITION UNCLEAR
-----------------------------
6. (C) Brattskar said, after noting the reference to &the
Government,s8 loss of confidence in the Norwegians, he had
written to Foreign Minister Kadirgamar stating that he would
assume that the JVP assertion in this regard was in error
unless he was advised otherwise by the GSL. There has been
no response. Brattskar noted that &we,ve all heard8
Kadirgamar,s now-standard view that the JVP is not cause for
concern since he is &bringing the boys along8 and slowly
turning them to a more centrist position. Brattskar said he
could certainly understand the need for the JVP to &blow off
steam8 if the party was slowly headed in the right direction
on the peace process. That is not the case. Rather, the JVP
is engaging in ugly rhetoric while heading in absolutely the
wrong direction on the peace front. Brattskar noted that
LTTE leader Prabhakaran, in his November 27 &Hero,s Day8
speech (septel) had commented extensively on how the JVP
position was, in the LTTE view, a major stumbling block on
the road back to the peace table. Brattskar commented that
he finds it increasingly difficult to explain the JVP´s
activities and the southern political situation in general to
the LTTE. &They think I´m a fool.8
7. (C) Brattskar said he will continue to seek clarity from
and make his frustration known to the GSL. He opined,
however, that President Kumaratunga will be unwilling to make
the JVP toe the line (although, according to what Brattskar
had heard, she is privately &furious8 with the JVP,s
actions) since her highest preoccupation these days is with
ensuring her political and parliamentary future. She
apparently has not talked to the JVP for over a month.
Exacerbating the situation, Brattskar said, are opposition
leader Ranil Wickremesinghe,s public comments over the
weekend that his UNP party will no longer support the
President in the peace process. This stems from UNP pique
over the recent financially induced defection of a party
member to the President,s coalition (with more such
defections rumored to be in the offing).
CO-CHAIR ACTION DISCUSSED
-------------------------
8. (C) Ambassador Suda said he thought that the co-chairs
needed to make clear to the government that the JVP-led
anti-Norwegian campaign is unacceptable. Co-chair reps
debated whether it made more sense to first see FM Kadirgamar
as a group or to seek a co-chair meeting directly with
President Kumaratunga (since the FM,s response would be
predictable). Brattskar said he wanted to talk quietly with
the GSL first and also needed more time to talk to Oslo. He
also said he wanted to get a readout on Norwegian peace envoy
Solheim,s December 1 meeting with LTTE luminary Balasingham
in London before undertaking any new initiatives here. All
agreed that they would consult with capitals with an eye
toward some sort of joint co-chair activity here in Colombo
towards the end of the week. Brattskar said he might not
join since Norway would be the topic of discussion.
COMMENT
-------
9. (C) Brattskar is right. The tone of the JVP-orchestrated
campaign is ugly and beyond the pale. We agree with him that
it is much more than &blowing off steam.8 With the
Department,s concurrence, we will be ready to participate in
a co-chair call on either the Foreign Minister or the
President later in the week (we think going directly to CBK,
who is just back from Iran, makes the most sense). We
believe the theme of the co-chair presentation should be that
Norway and the SLMM have our full support, that the GSL needs
to make clear that the JVP does not speak for the entire
government, that it is extremely confusing when two coalition
parties sign a petition condemning the Norwegian role in the
peace process (in direct contradiction of the President,s
public statements) and that the current situation of the JVP
being &in8 the coalition on some issues but &out8 on
others is having a deleterious effect on the peace process.
The unknown, of course, is whether the President is willing
to bring the JVP to heel when the party is crucial to her
ongoing political machinations regarding her political future
which, we fear, are at present a higher priority than the
peace process. End Comment.
LUNSTEAD
16. 23.1.2006: U/S Burns reviews Sri Lankan peace process with Norwegian facilitator Erik Solheim
1/23/2006 16:10
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000137
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SA/INS; PACOM FOR FPA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2016
TAGS: PREL, PINS, CE, NO
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS REVIEWS SRI LANKAN PEACE PROCESS WITH
NORWEGIAN FACILITATOR ERIK SOLHEIM
Classified By: DCM JAMES F. ENTWISTLE, REASON 1.4, B AND D
1. (C) Summary. Norwegian peace facilitator Solheim told
U/S Burns that the Sri Lankan peace process is at a
crossroads and that a "major step forward" is essential.
Burns expressed U.S. support for the Norwegian facilitation
effort and compared notes with Solheim on the efficacy and
vision of various Sri Lanka politicians. Solheim will
consider his visit a success if he gets agreement on dates
and locations for several rounds of ceasefire talks but does
not expect a lessening of LTTE violence even if talks begin.
Solheim and Burns agreed a late February/early March
co-chairs meeting in Colombo might make sense if there is
some tangible progress in the peace process before then.
Burns noted that President Bush´s early March trip to India
would be an opportunity for a public U.S. statement of
support for the process. Solheim and Burns held a short
"photo op" after their meeting and made joint statements on
the need to avoid a civil war and re-start peace talks. End
Summary
2. (C) U/S Nicholas Burns met with Norwegian Minister of
International Development and peace facilitator Erik Solheim
January 23 at the Ambassador´s residence. SA DAS Gastright,
Ambassador Lunstead and DCM (notetaker) sat in. Solheim was
accompanied by Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar and
several Norwegian emboffs/staffers.
Process At a Crossroads
-----------------------------
3. (C) Asked by Burns for his overall sense of the
situation, Solheim said "it is clear we are at a crossroads.
We must make a major step forward or it will go down the
drain." The status quo was no longer tenable. Solheim
continued that his impression is that the GSL needs to
develop a strategy for war or a strategy for peace but right
now it has neither. He hoped to help the GSL develop a
strategy for peace during this visit. Burns commented that
in his meeting with President Rajapaksa (septel) earlier in
the day, the President had expressed concern that his
military was too weak to take on the Tigers (Solheim will see
the President January 24). Burns noted that his message to
the President and other senior Sri Lankans had been
threefold: the U.S. supports Norway and the Sri Lankan
Monitoring Mission (SLMM), the GSL should not rise to LTTE
provocations and the GSL should take and keep the moral high
ground by being flexible on issues such as the venue for
cease-fire talks. As Secretary Rice had noted
to Foreign Minister Samaraweera several weeks ago in
Washington, the GSL should not give the LTTE an excuse to go
back to war by being stubborn on the venue issue.
Both Sides Obsessed with Venue Issue
--------------------------------------------- -
4. (C) Solheim said the U.S. position as outlined by Burns
was very helpful to Norwegian efforts. On the venue issue,
Solheim said it would have to be Oslo or Geneva in order to
bring the LTTE on board. In his view, however, the venue
issue has assumed too much importance and drawn attention
from the fact that the GSL has no real plan on how to proceed
towards peace once the short-term venue issue is settled.
Solheim confirmed that he will see reclusive LTTE supremo
Prabhakaran when he goes to Kilinochchi January 25 and noted
that it is good that LTTE theoretician Balasingham ("the
heavyweight thinker") will be there as well since Prabhakaran
is completely isolated and has no understanding of "the
South," much less the broader world. Solheim speculated that
Prabhakaran has not spoken to a Sinhalese in ten years.
Solheim´s objective is to get Prabhakaran (and Balasingham)
to agree to both the venue and principle of ceasefire talks.
Ideally, he would agree to a series of talks ("since the
COLOMBO 00000137 002 OF 002
first one will consist of a long recitation of Tamil
grievances!")
5. (C) Burns and Solheim agreed that is it imperative that
the GSL develop a strategy for peace and not leave the
initiative to the LTTE. The GSL right now, Solheim observed,
is focused on "domestic problems, but the LTTE couldn´t care
less." Burns agreed with Solheim´s observation that
President Rajapaksa means well and wants peace but has a
"shallow understanding" of the ethnic issue. Moreover, the
LTTE had given him absolutely no breathing space after his
inauguration before beginning to take out convoys and
soldiers. Burns observed that both the Foreign Minister and
the opposition leader conveyed a better sense of longterm
strategy and tactics than the President who came across as
"vague and indirect."
6. (C) Asked by Burns what would constitute a successful
result to his visit, Solheim said he would be pleased if he
left with a commitment to several rounds of ceasefire talks
with agreed dates and venues. He estimated that with
willingness and commitment from both sides, the first round
conceivably could be in 2-3 weeks. Solheim cautioned,
however, that even with such an agreement, he would have no
hope that the LTTE would scale back its campaign of violence
until the talks actually started, if then.
7. (C) Turning to the co-chair process, Solheim said it
made sense to hold the next meeting in Sri Lanka if there is
enough progress to justify a meeting. That will depend on
the success of his efforts over the next few days. Late
February or early March could make sense. Burns noted that
he could come to a Colombo co-chairs meeting at that time.
Moreover, if there is progress on the ceasefire talks,
President Bush could make a supportive public statement while
in South Asia.
8. (SBU) After their conversation, Burns and Solheim had a
"photo op" at which Burns made clear U.S. support for the
Norwegian facilitation effort and the Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission (SLMM). Solheim expressed his appreciation for the
support for his efforts by the U.S., the other co-chair
countries and the rest of the international community.
(Burns and Solheim each held individual press conferences
later in the day.)
9. (U) U/S Burns has cleared this message.
LUNSTEAD
17. 5.11.2003: President Affirms Commitment to Negotiated Settlement and Cease-fire
11/5/2003 14:04
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001918
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, S/CT, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/IP/NEA/SA
DEPT ALSO PLEASE PASS TOPEC
NSC FOR E. MILLARD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11-05-13
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, PTER, ASEC, MOPS, ECON, CASC, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process, PLO
SUBJECT: President Affirms Commitment to Negotiated
Settlement and Cease-fire
REFS: (A) COLOMBO 1916 (B) COLOMBO 1917
(U) CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE´ D´AFFAIRES JAMES F. ENTWISTLE.
REASONS 1.5 (b, d).
1. (C) Summary. President Kumaratunga called in the
Charge´ November 5 to clarify her actions. She said she is
committed to maintaining the ceasefire with the LTTE and to
reaching a "negotiated settlement" with the Tigers. She
wishes the Prime Minister success in this regard but felt
she had no choice but to take over the Defense and Interior
portfolios after what she sees as a two-year history of the
LTTE being allowed to "run wild." She told the Charge´ that
her imposition of a state of emergency is a preemptive
action to be used in case the Prime Minister´s supporters
take to the streets. The Charge´ told the President that
the U.S. is paying close attention to the safety and
security of American citizens. The President assured the
Charge´ that American citizens should go about their
business and should not change travel plans. In particular,
she said U.S. military cooperation activities already under
way should continue. The President seemed self-confident
and composed but unable to avoid veering into lengthy
historical accounts of the Prime Minister´s alleged perfidy
over the years. This clearly is personal. End Summary.
2. (C) President Chandrika Bandanaraike Kumaratunga called
in the Charge´ late on November 5. With her foreign affairs
advisor Lakshman Kadirgarmar sitting in, the President told
the Charge´ that she wanted to make sure that Washington got
the "full story" on the actions she had taken to "ensure the
integrity of the nation," especially in light of the "lies"
that are being spread against her.
3. (C) The President said that she had originally intended
to keep the defense portfolio, as Presidents historically
have. PM Wickremasinghe had "whined so much" about how he
needed to put his own defense minister in to move forward on
the peace process that "I gave it to him and have regretted
it ever since." The President then went through an
exhaustive review of various "failings" by the Prime
Minister in his dealings with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE), in particular, according to her, repeated
instances in which he had turned a "blind eye" to the Tigers
efforts to rearm and re-equip, in order to not damage the
"peace process." The President said she had had enough and,
after the latest flap with General Tellefsen, the head of
the Scandinavian monitoring mission, and after two years of
"being ignored" by the PM on defense matters, decided that
she had to act to take back control. The President stressed
her commitment to a "negotiated settlement" ("I like that
term better than ´peace process.´") but said the PM´s
efforts had allowed the LTTE to "run wild" since "they
realized that Ranil would allow anything to keep the peace
process going." "I will be gently firm with the Tigers but
they can´t be allowed to dance a jig whenever they want."
4. (C) In the same vein, the President said, she had taken
over the Interior Ministry to ensure that the police
function (which historically had resided in Defense,
according to her) would also be used "for the benefit of the
nation." It had been necessary to take back the Mass
Communications Ministry in order to ensure that the "PM´s
boys don´t twist things." Asked why she had taken back the
Finance Ministry (which had been "confirmed" to us shortly
before the meeting), President Kumaratunga looked at the
Charge´ blankly and said she had done no such thing and had
never even considered it.
5. (C) Turning to the suspension of Parliament, the
President said that was necessary to "let things cool down"
for two weeks and allow people to adjust to the steps she
had taken. She acknowledged that the suspension would delay
the budget debate by a week, but she said that was not a
significant consideration in light of the other "grave
matters" facing the country.
6. (C) Asked about the state of emergency, the President
said this was a preemptive action so that the military would
have the necessary powers in hand in case the Prime
Minister´s party loyalists tried to take to the streets.
She asked that Washington be informed that she is not
imposing a "state of siege" and that the "jackboots are not
marching down the street." "I fervently hope I will not
have to use any emergency powers." Rumors to the contrary,
she said, no curfew has been imposed.
7. (C) The Charge´ told the President that the primary
concern in Washington was whether her actions were intended
to scuttle the peace process at a key, delicate moment. The
President said that nothing could be further from the truth.
The Charge´ also told the President that the U.S. was
following the situation on the ground very closely in terms
of the security and safety of American citizens. So far, we
see no cause for alarm but we would continue to pay close
attention, especially now that terms like "state of
emergency" were in play. In particular, he noted, the U.S.
by coincidence had a number of military cooperation
activities under way. We intended to continue with these
unless the situation became unsafe or we were told to stand
down. The President said that safety and security were her
highest priorities. She asked that Washington be informed
that the "situation on the streets" is fine and that there
is no reason that Americans should not continue to go about
their business and to travel to Sri Lanka as planned. The
President said she plans to "address the nation in greater
detail" on November 6 and would underline those points in
those remarks. She also noted that, "as the new Defense
Minister," she was very pleased to hear about ongoing
military cooperation activities and that these should
proceed as planned.
8. (C) In conclusion, the President asked that the Charge´
convey the following points to Washington:
--she is well aware of and grateful for the positive role
the U.S. is playing in trying to end the conflict in Sri
Lanka. She asked that her warm regards be conveyed to
President Bush and said she hoped to meet him soon.
--she is fully committed to maintaining the cease-fire
agreement with the LTTE.
--she has no intention of "chasing out" the Norwegians from
their facilitation role or the Scandinavian monitors from
their "important work."
--"My commitment to a negotiated settlement is unwavering."
9. (C) Comment. The President appeared self-confident and
composed (as did her pet dog which wandered in and out of
the room). That said, she constantly detoured into long,
angry rants against the Prime Minister for his alleged
personal slights and insults over the years and historical
accounts of the myriad ways in which the PM has "betrayed"
the country. This is clearly a strongly felt personal issue
for her although she seemed sincere when she spoke about how
she is acting in the interests of the country. The
President listened closely as the Charge´ outlined the U.S.
concern for the peace process and for the welfare of U.S.
citizens. We will see what she says to the public tomorrow
but she is clearly determined and hunkered down for a long
haul. End Comment.
10. (U) Minimize considered.
ENTWISTLE
18. 21.5.2003: Tigers issue hard-edged letter demandinginterim structure in north/east
5/21/2003 11:46C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000851
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, INR/NESA; NSC FOR E. MILLARD
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/13
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINR, EAID, CE, NO, JA, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: Tigers issue hard-edged letter demanding
interim structure in north/east
Refs: (A) Colombo-SA/INS 05/21/03 unclass e-mail
- (B) Colombo 838, and previous
(U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of
Mission. Reasons: 1.5 (b,d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: The Tamil Tigers have sent the
Norwegian facilitators a tough letter demanding the
setting up of an "interim administrative structure" in
the north/east, which the group would control. The
Tigers say they might restart peace talks and come to
the Tokyo conference if the government reacts positively
to their proposal. With contacts telling us the group
is in an increasingly hard-line mode, the sudden
recrudescense of the interim structure idea raises real
questions regarding the Tigers´ commitment to the
process. END SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) TOUGH TIGER LETTER: Late May 21, the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) sent the
Norwegian government facilitators a tough letter
demanding the setting up of an interim structure in the
north and east. (Note: The text of the letter was
posted on the pro-LTTE website "TamilNet" and has been
sent to SA/INS in Ref A.) In the long, complicated, and
somewhat convoluted letter, which was addressed to
Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen, LTTE spokesman
Anton Balasingham makes clear that the Tigers believe
that previous agreements on structures/modalities of
funneling humanitarian/development assistance to the
north and east are not working. On this point,
Balasingham states flatly:
"Unfortunately, SIHRN (see note below) failed to
function effectively and no progress has been made
toward alleviating the hardships and suffering of the
displaced population...This lack of performance and the
failure to produce tangible results on urgent
humanitarian issues has eroded all confidence of the
Tamil people in SIHRN."
(Note: "SIHRN" stands for Sub-Committee on Immediate
Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs for the North and
East, which was formed earlier this year as a joint GSL-
LTTE committee working on assistance issues. Since the
committee was set up, the Tigers have basically argued
that they wanted watertight acknowledgement of their
right to control funds allotted for the north/east. End
Note.)
3. (U) In light of this characterization of SIHRN´s
performance and rejecting recent GSL proposals to reform
assistance implementation, Balasingham goes on to state
that the LTTE has no choice but to return to its long-
standing demand that an "interim administrative
structure" be set up for the north and east. (Note:
The letter is not clear, but the LTTE seems to be
envisaging that the interim structure would mainly focus
on economic matters, but would also have a dominant
political role.) In making this demand, Balasingham
notes that during the December 2001 national election
campaign the governing United National Party (UNP)
advocated the setting up of an interim structure to
govern the north and east. Although the idea of forming
such a body was left off the peace process´ agenda up to
now, Balasingham says the LTTE believes it is now time
to revive it because the proposal is the only way
forward given the failure of SIHRN and given that "a
permanent political settlement is not feasible in the
immediate future." While couching his public comments
carefully, Balasingham also leaves little doubt that the
LTTE should control this interim structure. He notes,
for example, that the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan accord
provided the "LTTE a dominant participatory role" in a
proposed interim council to govern the north/east.
(Note: Aside from this one mention of the Indo-Sri
Lankan accord, the letter is otherwise vague on
potential constitutional implications.)
4. (U) Balasingham also addresses the issue of the
peace talks, which the Tigers recently pulled out of,
and the upcoming donors conference in Tokyo, which the
Tigers have said they will not attend. He indicates
that a positive response to the LTTE´s demands might
lead the LTTE to change its mind on these matters,
stating:
"A positive and constructive response from the prime
minister setting out his ideas and proposals in clear
and concrete terms will certainly help our leadership to
take a crucial decision on the resumption of peace talks
and participation at the donor conference in Japan."
5. (C) TAMIL CONTACTS ON LTTE MINDSET: The LTTE letter
came out too late on May 21 for contacts to provide us a
considered response. In discussions with poloffs held
early May 21, however, Tamil political contacts who had
met with the LTTE on May 20, indicated that the group
was increasingly in a hard-line, uncompromising mode.
Echoing the comments of other Tamil National Alliance
(TNA) figures, Suresh Premachandran, told us that
political chief S.P. Thamilchelvam, who led the Tiger
side at the meeting, made clear that the LTTE was fed up
with the GSL. The LTTE felt that the government --
while basically well intentioned -- was not strong and
could not carry through on its plans because it was too
afraid of Sinhalese chauvinists. In making these
comments, Premachandran said Thamilchelvam asserted in
very strong terms that the Sinhalese south could not be
trusted because it had broken agreements with Tamils so
many times in the past. (Note: In a May 19 meeting,
Deputy Foreign Minister Helgesen told us that LTTE
leaders had made this same point in vivid terms during
recent interactions with the Norwegians.) At this
point, Premachandran added, the LTTE wanted written,
ironclad assurances from the GSL on the way forward, or
they would continue to stall the process.
6. (C) Despite their hardline positioning,
Premachandran still thought that the Tigers "were
committed to the peace process and would listen to
reason." He allowed that he was not sure the government
could meet in short order all of the LTTE´s demands and
thus ensure the group´s participation in the Tokyo
conference. He thought, however, that the LTTE had not
totally discounted the possibility of participating in
Tokyo.
7. (U) (((Note: Before Balasingham´s letter was
issued, we had heard that the LTTE´s S.P. Thamilchelvam
was planning to hold a press conference on May 22 in the
LTTE-controlled town of Kilinochchi in northern Sri
Lanka. This press conference had been originally slated
to take place on May 21, but had been postponed. In
light of Balasingham´s letter, which quite clearly
enunciates LTTE thinking at this point, it is not clear
whether the May 22 press conference is still on and what
it might add if it is. End Note.)))
8. (C) COMMENT: While respectful in tone, the LTTE
letter is hard-edged and clearly to be taken very
seriously. Balasingham, for example, at several points
in the letter underscores that he is transmitting the
views of V. Prabhakaran, the LTTE´s supreme leader.
The sudden recrudescence of the interim structure idea,
which had basically dropped from sight for months,
raises real questions re the Tigers´ commitment to the
process. The group almost certainly knows that the
issue is a very tricky one for the government and would
-- under normal circumstances -- take months to
negotiate. That said, the Tigers are pressing the
government for a response right now. This degree of
impatience does not appear to bode well for LTTE
agreement to resume the peace talks and reconsider its
decision not to participate in Tokyo. END COMMENT.
9. (U) Minimize considered.
WILLS
19. 17.11.2004: Possible ways forward in political standoff between Sri Lankan President and Prime Minister
11/17/2003 11:13
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001982
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, EUR/NB, INR/NESA
NSC FOR E. MILLARD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11-17-13
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINS, PTER, PINR, CE, NO, Political Parties
SUBJECT: Possible ways forward in political standoff
between Sri Lankan President and Prime Minister
Refs: (A) Colombo 1974
- (B) Colombo 1971, and previous
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b, d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: President Kumaratunga and Prime
Minister Wickremesinghe continue to consult to find a
workable solution to the current political struggle.
The PM has remained focused on the peace process
throughout the crisis. Reaction from international as
well as domestic parties has been focused on possible
repercussions for the peace process. Several options
remain available to resolve the imbroglio, and attention
is now focused on which will play out. END SUMMARY.
--------------------------------------------- --
President remains steadfast on Defense Ministry
--------------------------------------------- --
2. (C) As previously reported, following her November 4
takeover of three key ministries and prorogation of
Parliament, President Kumaratunga has publicly called
for a national government of reconciliation, invited the
PM for talks, and met with Norwegian peace facilitators.
Throughout these past two weeks, the President has
repeatedly stated that she supports the peace process
and ceasefire accord. However, the President has
remained steadfast that she retain the Defense Ministry,
a key component in the peace process. While the initial
round of talks with the PM did not break the impasse
between the two, there are some signs that a workable
compromise might be possible. The President and Prime
Minister will meet again on November 18.
---------------------------
PM focused on peace process
---------------------------
3. (C) Prime Minister Wickremesinghe, for his part,
has remained focused on the peace process throughout his
efforts to bring resolution to the current political
crisis. Avoiding direct criticism of the President, the
PM has worked to provide leadership to his United
National Front (UNF) party, to temper UNF hardliners
advocating retaliation against the President, and to
appeal to the international community for support. He
has let key party politicians, such as peace process
negotiator G.L. Peiris and chief whip Mahinda
Samarasinghe, garner domestic support and argue the
GSL´s position in the public arena. He maintains that,
without control of the defense portfolio, he can not be
in charge of the peace process, and thus has offered the
President this responsibility. While the Prime Minister
publicly says he is willing to work with the President,
privately he is skeptical of such cohabitational
success.
--------------------------------
Concern over President´s actions
--------------------------------
4. (C) Reaction to the President´s November 4-5 actions
has centered mainly on the possible effect on the peace
process. (Septel addresses the economic ramifications.)
Support for the PM has been especially strong, with 130
MPs signing a letter expressing their full confidence,
and thousands of supporters rallying in support upon his
return. While several political parties have expressed
admiration and support for the President, she has also
come under criticism -- by segments of the Buddhist
clergy, for example -- for causing complications in the
peace process at an extremely crucial time. Members of
the international community, including the U.S., UK, EU,
India and Japan have issued statements and/or publicly
expressed concern over the situation, stressing the need
for the peace process to continue. Tamil political
parties and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
have also voiced their concern over the effects that the
President-PM wrangling might have on the peace process,
but all in all, the Tigers seem to be appraising the
situation in the south judiciously.
------------------------
Effects on Peace Process
------------------------
5. (C) Even with the Defense Ministry now under the
President, there has been no short-term impact to the
peace process vis-a-vis the military and the ceasefire.
The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) continues to
report a high degree of cooperation with the military,
and statements made by defense officials (see Ref B)
indicate that the military will continue to act with
prudence while civilians sort out the political
situation. Both the President and the Tigers have
stressed the importance of the ceasefire continuing.
At a November 14 press conference, however, Norwegian
Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen emphasized the
need for clarity in the south in order for real progress
in the peace track, and stated that until such clarity
existed, there was no space to assist the GSL and the
Tigers in peace negotiations. Helgesen has made clear
he believes the ceasefire could come undone if the
situation drags on unresolved too long.
------------------
Ways to Go Forward
------------------
6. (C) As the Prime Minister and President propose ways
to create a workable solution to the events of the past
two weeks, there is much speculation regarding the
ultimate way forward. Depending on the current mood of
the President or PM, several options appear likely.
They include:
-- Returning the Ministries: In this scenario, the
President would return control to the government of the
defense, interior and mass communications ministries.
The government would presumably provide some face-saving
method for the President to do so. While this would
restore the GSL´s control of the peace process, the
situation would not resolve the President´s cohabitation
disagreements that precipitated her November 4 actions.
There is talk she might give back Interior and Mass
Communication but keep Defense and/or that a Defense
Secretary palatable to both the PM and the President
SIPDIS
might be appointed.
-- Cohabitational Committee: According to the PM´s
idea, a committee comprising representation by the GSL
and the Opposition would advise the government on the
peace process. This would formalize an arrangement for
the President to provide her input on the GSL´s peace
process decisions and possibly address her contention
(which has some merit) that the PM does not "consult"
with her regarding negotiations with the Tigers. This
is also sometimes referred to as a "council of
concilitation."
-- Elections: From the President´s perspective, her
hope in calling elections would be for her People´s
Alliance (PA) party to increase its number of seats,
and, in coalition with other parties, regain the
majority in Parliament. This would put the President in
control of the peace process. The PM believes that
parliamentary elections would result in more seats for
his UNF coalition, serving to strengthen his mandate to
lead the peace process. Even if the UNF were to
increase its majority, a resolution to the current
crisis could still be elusive: the government would
still have to cohabitate with the President, who remains
in her position regardless of the electoral outcome.
Moreover, there is a palpable sense of dread at the
prospect of elections which historically are violent and
corrupt.
-- Standoff: If neither the PM or President agree on
the ministerial or committee option and elections are
not called, it is possible that the current standoff
could continue. The government would continue its
business, with Parliament meeting to work on the budget.
Negotiations with the LTTE, however, would likely remain
on hold with neither the PM or President in clear
control of the peace process. As noted above, this
poses a danger to the peace process.
7. (C) COMMENT: Mission´s position so far has been to
emphasize to all parties the need for the peace process
to be supported, while not becoming embroiled in the
internecine political struggle between the President and
PM. The first test of the changed political landscape
and a marker of the PM´s and President´s willingness to
resolve this comes on Wednesday, November 19 when
Parliament is set to reconvene and the GSL presents the
budget after the two week prorogation. While fresh
elections are possible, they would likely be expensive
and violent, and result in a situation not that much
different from the current stalemate. Mature
cooperation between the PM and President to take the
peace process forward would be the best possible
outcome, but the two have a long history of rivalry,
which they would have to put behind them. END COMMENT.
8. (U) Minimize considered.
LUNSTEAD
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